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We investigate the degree of financial integration within and between European countries. We construct
two measures of de-facto integration across European regions to capture "diversification" and "development"
finance in the language of Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). We find evidence that capital market integration
within the EU is less than what is implied by theoretical benchmarks and also less than what is found
for U.S. states. We ask - why is this the case? Using country-level data for economic institutions, we
find that these are not able to explain differences between countries. Using regional data from the World
Values Surveys, we investigate the effect of "social capital" on financial integration among European




















Financial markets are becoming more integrated as countries lower barriers to trading in
ﬁnancial assets such as stocks and bonds. Such integration will tend to equate expected
returns to investing in diﬀerent countries but the ownership of physical capital in a country
may still be mainly in the hand of domestic residents. In this paper, we investigate the
degree of ﬁnancial integration within Europe using a measure suggested by Kalemli-Ozcan,
Reshef, Sørensen, and Yosha (2007), who ﬁnd that ownership of physical capital among the
50 U.S. states is almost perfectly diversiﬁed across the entire United States.1
We ﬁnd little evidence of capital market integration— deﬁned as diversiﬁcation of own-
ership of physical capital—between EU countries, except for Ireland. Our main focus is to
examine if regions within EU countries are integrated. We ﬁnd stronger evidence of capital
market integration for EU regions within countries. However, the amount of this integration
is still less than what is implied by a simple benchmark model with fully diversiﬁed owner-
ship of physical capital. We examine if the degree of capital market integration depends on
“social capital” proxied by conﬁdence and trust and we discover that regions where the level
of conﬁdence and trust is high are more ﬁnancially integrated with each other.
Standard neoclassical models predict that capital will move to regions where the marginal
product of capital is higher. Within a fully integrated capital market with no “frictions”
this implies that capital will ﬂow to regions with the highest productivity. As shown by
Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1996) and Clark and Feenstra (2003), in a world of completely
mobile capital the amount of physical capital installed in a country relative to the world
average is fully explained by total factor productivity (TFP). In reality, the actual return may
deviate from the marginal product of capital for numerous reasons. Risk-adjusted returns to
investment may not be as high as suggested by low capital-labor ratios. Countries with low
capital-labor ratios might receive less foreign investment than implied by benchmark models
1Cross-ownership across states can take the form of direct ownership through stocks but in most cases
cross-ownership is indirect through ﬁnancial intermediaries and through corporations with branches in many
states. We have not explored channels of ownership but in the United States direct stock holdings appear
to be too small to explain near-perfect diversiﬁcation.
1due to their low productivity. Recent research show a positive relation between capital ﬂows
and various determinants of productivity, such as property rights (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan,
Volosovych, 2007), low cost of physical capital (Hsieh and Klenow, 2007; Caselli and Feyrer,
2007), and low risk of default (Gertler and Rogoﬀ, 1990; Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2004). As
shown by Kraay and Ventura (2000) low productivity countries’ implied risk premiums on
foreign investment are quite high. Current productivity depends on the broader institutional
framework which is a function of the historical past of countries as shown by Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Hence, history may inﬂuence current ﬁnancial performance
through institutions. In the EU, laws and institutions are intended to secure the free ﬂow of
capital; however, these de-jure laws may only be a part of investor protection de-facto.
Our goal here is to examine EU regions within EU countries, a similar setting to U.S.
states, where the conditions of the basic neoclassical model with diversiﬁed ownership are
likely to hold. We also consider EU countries although it is well known that net ﬂows at
the country level are small and country assets are not well diversiﬁed.2 La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) show that countries with diﬀerent historical legal
traditions diﬀer in ﬁnancial performance. This may aﬀect the level of within-country capital
market integration. However, we ﬁnd little evidence that country level institutions matter
for intercountry capital market integration. Maybe institutional diﬀerences are too minor
too matter in the EU or maybe formal institutions function diﬀerently in diﬀerent cultural
environments.3
Why may identical institutions in diﬀerent societies have diﬀerent impacts? Regions
within countries often diﬀer in the levels of “social capital” even if laws and formal institutions
are identical. People will likely to invest less if they trust each other less and have no
conﬁdence in institutions; i.e., when the level of “social capital” is low. Hence, in this
2For a recent treatment of these issues see Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and
Zhu (2007) respectively. The phenomenon of no-diversiﬁcation is often refereed as“home bias” and was ﬁrst
documented by French and Poterba (1991). Home bias has declined signiﬁcantly in the last decade but
important deviations from full diversiﬁcation still exist.
3There is two-way causality between culture and institutions as argued by Inglehart (2000). Thus, Fer-
nandez (2007) argues that, work that attempts to undercover whether institutions or culture is the most
important determinant of economic development may not be fruitful.
2paper we proxy “social capital” with trust and conﬁdence. Speciﬁcally, our “trust” variable
is measured as whether respondents in the World Values Survey agree with the statements
“most people can be trusted” and “I trust other people in the country” and our “conﬁdence”
variable is measured as whether the respondents agree to have conﬁdence in the courts, the
parliament, and other institutions.4
We display in Figure 1 and Figure 2 the relative (to the country average) degree of trust
and conﬁdence, respectively, in the EU countries for which the data are available. In the
ﬁgures, the darker the color, the higher the level of trust or conﬁdence. There are systematic
diﬀerences within countries, for example, Scotland displays high trust and conﬁdence and
the level of trust is higher in northern than in southern Germany while the level of conﬁdence
is higher in western than in eastern Germany. Early studies by political scientists on the
eﬀects of “social capital” were inspired by the diﬀerences in the levels of trust in northern
versus southern Italy. This pattern be readily seen from Figure 1.5 Motivated by the early
ﬁndings for Italy and the regional variation in the endowments of social capital across Europe,
Tabellini (2005) investigates the eﬀect of culture (measured as trust and conﬁdence) on per
capita output levels of European regions controlling for country eﬀects. He aggregates to
the regional level the individual responses collected in the opinion polls of the World Values
Survey in the 1990s (Inglehart, 2000). In this paper, we attempt to explain the diﬀerences
in ﬁnancial integration among European regions rather than the output diﬀerences studied
by Tabellini.6
Our regional dataset is ideal for examining de-facto versus de-jure ﬁnancial integration
within Europe since we can exploit variation among European regions and control for na-
tional legal systems and institutions. We investigate the eﬀect of trust and conﬁdence on
4See data appendix for the exact deﬁnitions.
5See Banﬁeld (1958) and Putnam (1993) who have argued that the diﬀerences in social and economic
behavior between northern and southern Italy can be traced back to their distant histories and traditions, and
that these diﬀerent endowments of “social capital” in turn contribute to explain the economic backwardness
of southern Italy.
6Beugelsdijk and von Schaik (2001) and Knack and Keefer (1997) perform an analysis similar to that of
Tabellini for European regions studying the correlation between indicators of social capital and per capita
output.
3Figure 1: Trust within EU
4Figure 2: Conﬁdence within EU
5ﬁnancial integration among the European regions controlling for country level eﬀects. In
correspondence with the dictum that “culture matters,” we ﬁnd that regions with high lev-
els of conﬁdence and trust are more ﬁnancially integrated with similar regions within the
same country.7
Recently, there has been extensive research eﬀort put into answering the question, “do
diﬀerences in beliefs and preferences vary systematically across groups of individuals over
time and do these diﬀerences explain diﬀerences in outcomes?”8 In some cultures banks are
not trusted and cash (or precious metals) is the only accepted store of value. Such savings
vehicles are not optimal for ﬁnancial intermediation and, thus, capital market integration.
Financial contracts are typically trust-intensive—even if a wronged party can rely on the
courts this may be too expensive in terms of money and time to be worthwhile. Therefore,
social capital may have major eﬀects on ﬁnancial development. Guiso et al. (2004a) study
the eﬀects of social capital on domestic ﬁnancial development using household data from
Italy and ﬁnd that individuals with high social capital in Italy make diﬀerent ﬁnancial
choices than individuals with low social capital in the use of checks or portfolio allocation.
They argue that, for ﬁnancial exchange, not only legal enforceability of contracts matters but
also the extent to which the ﬁnancier trusts the ﬁnancee.9 Guiso et al. (2004b) investigate
the relationship between trust and trade and portfolio investment in a bilateral country
setting. Since more trade increases growth which in turn will raise trust, they use exogenous
variation in trust proxied by common language, border, legal system, and genetic-ethnic
7The phrase “culture matters” was ﬁrst popularized by Landes (1998). We use the terms social capital
and culture as synonyms in this paper and assume trust and conﬁdence are important determinants of both.
Fukuyama (2002) argues that there is no agreement on what social capital is. He deﬁnes it as cooperation
among people for common ends on the basis of shared informal norms and values. Hence social capital is a
utilitarian way of looking at culture. He also argues that in some forms social capital can be destructive to
development if it creates family networks that are resistant to change and involves mistrust of strangers as
in Latin America (as also argued by Banﬁeld for Italy). In Fukuyama’s words: “It is not suﬃcient to go into
a village, note the existence of networks, label it social capital, and pronounce it a good thing.” A detailed
analysis of social capital is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we emphasize that the questions on
which we base our measures of social capital involves conﬁdence and trust in collective institutions such as
the EU rather than conﬁdence and trust in narrow networks such as families.
8See Fernandez (2007) and Guiso et al. (2006) for excellent surveys on this topic.
9They measure regional social capital by electoral participation and by the frequency with which people
in a region donate blood.
6distance between two countries’ populations. They ﬁnd that a country that trust another
country less, trade less with and invest less in that county. Others have looked at the eﬀect
of culture on various individual decisions such as fertility and labor supply.10
Greif (1994) stresses the interaction between culture and institutions and describes how
the diﬀerent cultures of Maghribi traders (who set up horizontal relations where merchants
served as agents for traders) and Genoese traders (who set up a vertical relation where
individuals specialized as merchants) in the late medieval period led them to develop diﬀerent
institutions, and how this mattered for their subsequent development paths.11 Providing
causal evidence of the inﬂuence of culture on development turns out to be the key issue in
this literature.12 At the country level it is hard to identify causal eﬀects because diﬀerences
in beliefs may be the consequence of diﬀerent economic and institutional environments. Also,
as argued by Inglehart (2000), culture is endogenous to development and changes over time
as a result of “modernization.”13
Financial integration may take two forms. Agents and regions may use ﬁnancial markets
1) to diversify risk or 2) to invest net capital in highly productive regions. This process
has been referred to as “diversiﬁcation versus development ﬁnance” by Obstfeld and Taylor
(2004). We propose two metrics for measuring diversiﬁcation and development ﬁnance both
of which are based on the net capital income ﬂows between regions. In the country-level
national accounts net capital income ﬂows are approximately equal to the diﬀerence be-
tween Gross National Income (“income”) and Gross Domestic Product (“output”).14 GDP
10See Fernandez et al. (2002, 2004), Fernandez (2007), and Glaeser et al. (2000).
11Zak and Knack (2001) investigate the relation between trust and growth in a cross-country setting while
La Porta et al. (1997) investigate the eﬀect of trust in the working of large organizations. Fukuyama (2002)
argues that one of the reasons why the “Washington Consensus” to development of transitional economies
failed in 1990s was because it fails to incorporate the role of social capital.
12Fernandez (2007) points out that the usual practice of exploiting religious composition of a country as
the source of exogenous variation may be problematic since it may explain the aggregate outcome through
other channels than directly through social capital.
13Another problem is measuring the change in culture. As argued by Fukuyama (2002), even the most
ambitious study of social capital by Putnam (2000) cannot convincingly identify the sign of the change in
social capital in the United States over the last 40 years. Inglehart (2000) argues that some cultural values are
very persistent in spite of modernization and some may not change at all. He concludes that modernization
theory is probabilistic and not deterministic.
14In the country-level national accounts, the diﬀerence between GDP and Gross National Income is net
7is observed for European regions but the region-level equivalent of GNI is not. We use ap-
proximations to regional-level GNI based on observed regional personal income and the ratio
of GDP to GNI (“output/income”) is then an indicator of net capital income.15
We estimate two sets of regressions using data from 168 NUTS2 level regions and, due
to lack of data for some variables, 105 regions composed of NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions
as a mixed sample.16 The ﬁrst set of regressions examine whether the change of the out-
put/income ratio is positive for regions with high growth. Intuitively, if capital ownership
is fully diversiﬁed, the capital in a region will mainly be owned by non-residents. Assuming
that the income share to capital is 0.33, a relative increase in growth should be associated
with a increase in the ratio of output to income of about one third times the relative change
in growth because a fraction 0.33 of the growth in output is generating capital income which
is diﬀused over the whole country.17 Thus we interpret the slope coeﬃcient from the regres-
sion of the change in the output/income ratio on regional growth as the de-facto measure of
ﬁnancial integration; i.e., a measure of diversiﬁcation ﬁnance.
If capital ﬂows to high growth regions we should, everything else equal, see that high
output regions run current account deﬁcits and hold negative net asset positions.18 On the
other hand, poorer regions might become competitive due do “recent” changes in technology
or human capital accumulation and “catch-up growth” may be observed where low output
factor income which includes net foreign income to capital and net earnings of domestic residents (not
citizens) abroad. However, foreign earnings of domestic residents are usually fairly small compared to capital
income.
15In the national accounts, personal income can be found (approximately) from Gross National Income by
subtracting corporate proﬁts and net personal interest payments and adding transfers. Subtracting personal
taxes gives disposable personal income. In the present paper we have data for regional income that does not
include transfers, making it closer to Gross National Income—see the appendix for a more precise description
of our data.
16NUTS refers to Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.
17This result is derived in more detail in Section 2.
18Kraay and Ventura (2002) develop a model where investment risk is high and diminishing returns are
weak. The implication of their model is such that current account response should be equal to the savings
generated by the positive productivity shock multiplied by country’s share of foreign assets in total assets.
This implies that positive productivity shocks lead to deﬁcits in debtor countries and surpluses in creditor
countries. Our model is consistent with this, though in our case debtor countries can will have higher output
than in their model because we assume full diversiﬁcation while they assume no diversiﬁcation and therefore
high required risk premia.
8regions have higher growth than more developed regions and, as a result, are attracting
capital from other regions; an example is the U.S. southern states in the 1950s.19 We run
a second set of regressions that are informative about net capital ﬂows and examine the
relationship between the level of the output/income ratio and the level of output. We
interpret the ratio as a proxy for past net ﬂows; i.e., a measure of development ﬁnance.
One caveat of the measure for development ﬁnance is that it is not tied as closely to
the model as the measure of diversiﬁcation ﬁnance. Even if capital is ﬂowing to rich and
productive regions this measure may fail to account for this for the following reasons: 1)
Proﬁts paid from a region may be temporarily large relative to past investments (leading to
a low output/income ratio), for example in case of oil rich regions receiving wind-fall gains
due to sudden surges in world oil prices and 2) governments may interfere with income ﬂows
which will distort our measure. For example, governments may support private investment
or engage in public investment in declining coal mining regions. In such a scenario capital
ownership may be well diversiﬁed (high degree of diversiﬁcation ﬁnance) but net capital
ﬂows are minor (low degree of development ﬁnance). It is also feasible that governments
systematically divert funds to poorer regions for development reasons. Indeed we ﬁnd that
high output regions hold negative asset positions in northern Europe but not in the South
(Portugal, Italy, and Spain). Comparing results using income before and after transfers and
subsidies indicate that the result for the South is, at least partly, due to government subsidies
and taxation channelling money to low output regions.
Overall, we ﬁnd evidence that capital market integration within the EU is less than what
is implied by theoretical benchmarks and less than what is found for U.S. states.20 We also
ﬁnd little evidence that institutions matter for intercountry capital market integration in
the EU while we ﬁnd that regions with high conﬁdence and trust levels are more ﬁnancially
19Note that Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) and Prasad et al. (2007) ﬁnd exactly the opposite in a de-
veloping country context; i.e., they ﬁnd capital goes to less productive countries and a positive correlation
between current account and growth, respectively.
20We focus on integration through ﬂows of production capital and thus our results are complementary to
those found in the ECB (2007) report, which show increased integration among money and bond markets but
less integration in the banking sector. See also Giannone and Reichlin (2006) for risk sharing and volatility
within EU and Lane (2006) for a survey on the eﬀects of the EMU.
9integrated with each other within countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, where details are presented
in the Appendix. Section 3 lays out the econometric speciﬁcations and Section 4 describes
the data. Section 5 undertakes the empirical exercise and Section 6 concludes.
2 Benchmark Model




i , where Kit is capital installed in state i. The aggregate (the sum of
all the regions considered) capital stock installed is Kt and Kt is also total capital owned.
Region i owns a positive share φit of the total so capital owned φitKt where Σφit = 1 and
and Kt = ΣKit. Productivity levels diﬀer across states. The ex ante rate of return to
investment is Rt for all states and the relative amount of capital installed in each region will
be determined by the equilibrium condition that the marginal return to capital equals the
interest rate.
The equilibrium condition is illustrated in Figure 3. The MPK schedule shows how
marginal product varies as the capital stock increases. For given labor force, productivity,
and depreciation rate (δ), an increase in the capital stock will reduce its marginal product
due to the law of diminishing returns.21 The aggregate interest rate is constant (assumed
to be 0.06). The interest rate can be a world interest rate or an endogenously determined
equilibrium interest rate but in our application with many regions the interest rate can be
considered given for individual regions, akin to a small open economy assumption. The
domestic capital stock is determined by the equation MPK = R. The equilibrium capital-
labor ratio is higher in region 2 with higher productivity than in region 1. In Figure 3, the
MPK schedule for the high productivity region is given by the dashed line and the MPK
schedule for the lower productivity region is given as the solid line. The level of productivity
is set to be 1.5 times higher in the high productivity region; i.e., A2 = 1.5A1.
21Note that the return to capital, α is assumed to be 1/3.






α 1 δ    (A2=1.5 A1)
K1 K2
R=0.06
11We show the deterministic version of our model for simpler exposition. A more detailed
model would allow for uncertainty but under the assumption that capital ownership is fully
diversiﬁed risk premiums would be negligible. Kraay and Ventura (2002) argue that countries
tend to hold all physical capital installed in their own country and this lack of diversiﬁcation
is an important explanation for international investment patterns. This may well be true
for countries but in this paper we measure the deviation from our simple benchmark model
and do not attempt to explain why country-level data may deviate.22






















φit RtKt + (1 − α)GDPit
. (1)
We allow for changes in the labor force due to migration. We consider two cases: a) migrants
bring no assets and b) migrants bring average assets. Other cases can easily be interpolated
or extrapolated from these. In case a) dGNP/dL is (1−α)dGDP/dL as migrants will only
receive labor income while in case b) dGNP/dL = dGDP/dL. When capital instantly ﬂows
to restore the capital labor ratio, dGDP/dL = (GDP/L)dL because the per capita capital















− αdLit/Lit . (3)
It is obvious that the ratio of output to income will be decreasing in the ownership share
φit of region i for given output. The ratio will be temporarily increasing when a region is
hit by a productivity shock but Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2007) show that for typical parameter
22Recall that we ﬁnd in earlier work that our benchmark model ﬁts U.S. intra-national investment patterns
well.
12values a region’s output/income ratio will converge back to the equilibrium value of unity if
no further productivity shocks hit, with a half-life for the deviation of about 15 years.23
Consider for simplicity the case where all ownership shares initially are identical and
equal to 1/N = Lit/Lt, where depreciation is nil, and where Lt is aggregate population and
where regions j outside of region i has Ajt = At and region i is negligible in the total. For
φit = 1/N, we have φitRtKt = 1
NRtKt = 1
NαGDPt, and the predicted GDP/GNI ratio for





i.e., after controlling for ownership shares, regions with relatively high output per capita
will have high values of the output/income ratio. We do not observe ownership shares by
region so we are limited to examining the relation of the output/income ratio to output.
We can imagine three cases: 1) the output/income ratio is high in high output states—we
expect to ﬁnd this where capital markets are highly integrated, output has little correlation
with ownership, and the government doesn’t interfere with geographical ﬂows of income
or investment; 2) the output/income ratio has a negative relation to output—we expect
to ﬁnd this relation during “catch-up” growth where formerly poor regions (with current
low ownership shares) grow fast; or 3) little relation between the output/income ratio and
output—we expect to ﬁnd this where government tend to direct income ﬂows or where
markets are badly integrated.
Finally, we show how the output/income ratio varies with productivity in the simple case















1−α and we have the output/income






. See Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
(2007) for more details.
23More precisely, they assume that the saving rate is constant across regions at 15 percent, α = 0.33, and
a depreciation rate of 5 percent per year.
133 Econometric Model
We describe our regression speciﬁcations at the regional level. The country level regressions
are quite similar. The regressions are motivated by our benchmark model. The model
assumes that capital ownership is fully diversiﬁed across regions and that capital adjusts to
the equilibrium level within one period following productivity shocks. The model ignores
adjustment costs and business cycle patterns and is intended as a model for the “medium
run.” The main implication of the model is that when capital ownership is diversiﬁed then an
increase in productivity will lead to an increase in growth. But the increase in output will be
followed by a lower increase in income because the share of income going to capital—typically
found to be one-third—is going to capital owners in other regions. The output/income ratio
will, therefore, be expected to increase by about one-third times the increase in output.
We calculate the ratio of output to income for each region i in each year t. We compute
(OUTPUT/INCOME)it =
GRPit /INCit
GRPt /INCt , where GRPt = Σi GRPit , INCt = Σi INCit and GRPi is gross
regional GDP of region i, INC is personal income, and the summation is over the regions of
all EU countries in our sample. We scale the ratio because personal income is systematically
lower than GDP which includes depreciation and because EU-wide aggregate current account
deﬁcits and surpluses may change the ratio.24 The ratio (OUTPUT/INCOME)it captures region
i’s output/income ratio in year t relative to the aggregate output/income ratio of the EU.
3.1 Change Regressions
Our main regression tests if capital ownership is fully diversiﬁed. The speciﬁcation takes the
form
∆(OUTPUT/INCOME)i = µc + α∆log GDPi + ei,
where ∆(OUTPUT/INCOME)i = (OUTPUT/INCOME)i,2003−(OUTPUT/INCOME)i,1996 and ∆log GDPi =
log GDPi,1994 −log GDPi,1991. The sample for growth and for the output/income ratio are non-
overlapping to prevent measurement errors in output to enter on both sides of the equality
24As is clear from Table 2 non-scaled output/income ratios are much bigger than unity.
14sign because that would create a spurious correlation between the left- and right-hand sides.
The change in the output/income ratio is calculated for 7 years, rather than 1, in order
to capture “medium run” changes and to minimize noise. We use the longest sample of
consistent data available to us. GDP growth on the right-hand side is per capita for 3
years in order to minimize the impact of short term ﬂuctuations.25 The period 1991–1994
is fairly short for our purpose but fortunately growth in Europe was quite high during this
period with signiﬁcant regional variation after the uniﬁcation of Germany.26 µc is a dummy
variable for each country—if countries within the EU were fully integrated the coeﬃcients to
the dummy variables would be identical but the data clearly rejects this assumption. This
is consistent with the country-level results presented below.
We also estimate the relation
∆(OUTPUT/INCOME)i = µc + αc ∆log GDPi + ei ,
where we allow the coeﬃcient to regional growth to vary across countries and we will test
if the statistical hypothesis αc = α (i.e., that the slope coeﬃcients are identical) can be
accepted.
We further add variables on the right hand side as suggested by our model. We add
population growth from 1992 to 1994. If population growth is dominated by migrants ar-
riving with few assets then this increase the output but not income and therefore boost the
output/income ratio. If changes in population are dominated by wealthy retirees moving
out (or dying) this will lower income and also increase the output/income ratio. We further
include the lagged, 1995, output/income ratio. The output/income ratio is mean reverting
if the saving rate is constant and the same for labor and capital income: when a (relative)
positive productivity shock hits a region, output goes up more than income, but wages also
go up and higher wages, in connection with a constant saving rate, will lead to higher in-
25We have available 4 years of regional output constructed using a diﬀerent base year than the later data.
26Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sørensen, and Yosha (2007) ﬁnd that the results for the United States are not
very sensitive to the period length as long as it is not very short.
15come and saving and eventually the output/income ratio will approach unity in the absence
of further shocks. Hence the lagged ratio will have a negative coeﬃcient.
If ownership of capital is fully diversiﬁed, we expect to ﬁnd an estimated α-coeﬃcient of
about 0.33. If we ﬁnd a coeﬃcient smaller than this, we may ask if some regions are better
integrated than others. For example, are regions where individuals endowed with higher
levels of social capital more diversiﬁed than other regions? We examine this question by
estimating the regression
∆(OUTPUT/INCOME)i = µc + δXi + α∆log GDPi + γ (Xi − X)∆log GDPi + ei,,
where Xi refers to an “interaction” variable that measures the average level of social capital
(measured by conﬁdence or trust) in the region and the coeﬃcient γ to the interacted term
captures whether the output/income ratio reacts more to growth where the level of social
capital is high.27 If γ is positive and signiﬁcant we interpret this as showing that capital
markets are more integrated between regions with high trust and conﬁdence. We include
the non-interacted eﬀect of X because the non-interacted eﬀect might have a direct eﬀect
on income and/or output via savings and if the X-term is left out this could spuriously be
captured by the interaction term. As interactions, we will also use indicators of institutional
quality, available at the country level.28
3.2 Level regressions
The level of capital income ﬂows, approximated by the level of the output/income ratio will
typically reﬂect past net capital ﬂows (i.e., development ﬁnance). The level regressions take
the form
(OUTPUT/INCOME)i = µc + αG log GDPi + ei ,
27The interaction variable X is demeaned in order to keep the interpretation of the γ coeﬃcient unchanged
as explained by Ozer-Balli and Sorensen (2007).
28In this case there will not be a direct main eﬀect of X because it gets absorbed by the country dummies.
16where the output/income ratio is averaged over 1995 to 2003 and log GDPi on the right hand
side, which we refer to as “initial GDP” in this setting, is averaged over 1991–1994.29 αG
varies across groups of countries and we test if this model can be accepted against a model
where the coeﬃcient αc vary across all countries.30 We also estimate regressions of the form
(OUTPUT/INCOME)i = µc + δXi + αG log GDPi + γ (Xi − X)log GDPi + ei ,
in order to examine if “X” variables, such as trust or conﬁdence, are related to whether the
output/income ratio is high or low in countries with diﬀerent levels of initial output. Again,
we include the non-interacted eﬀect of X since the non-interacted eﬀect might have a direct
eﬀect on income and/or output via savings and if the X-term is left out this could spuriously
be captured by the interaction term.
4 Data
Our analysis is performed for the 168 NUTS2 regions including the countries for which we
have data with more than one region. If regions are too small income patterns may reﬂect
commuting rather than capital income ﬂows and we, therefore, also performed most of our
regressions at the 65 larger NUTS1 level regions and found similar results. An exception to
this is Greece, which also has the character of an outlier, being less economically developed
than most of the other countries in our sample. Statistical tests for pooling of data also found
that Greece didn’t ﬁt the pattern of other countries. Therefore, we decided to exclude Greece
from the analysis. We construct a mixed sample of 105 NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions for the
regressions that uses data from World Values Survey to match the regional speciﬁcation
in World Values Survey. We describe the World Values Survey in more detail in the data
appendix but the data we use are based on individual level surveys which we aggregate to the
29The 1992–1994 growth rates used in the change regressions are based on 1991–1994 levels data.
30We initially tested if the coeﬃcients for all countries could be accepted to be identical, this statistical
hypothesis was clearly rejected.


































































































































































NUTS1 and NUTS2 level as a mixed sample. We also take the average over the 2 questions
in the survey involving trust and over 11 relevant questions involving conﬁdence in order to
minimize noise—for robustness we also examine an average of 3 questions about conﬁdence,
the trade-oﬀ is that using less variables may lead to a more noisy measure while the beneﬁt
of using only 3 question is that these questions may be the more relevant.
4.1 Graphical Evidence
In Figure 4, we display the regional output/income ratio versus regional relative growth (the
regional growth rate minus the growth rate of the country to which the region belongs) for
a selection of NUTS1 regions for 4 selected regions from sample. We selected regions, from
18diﬀerent countries, that display changes in growth in order to get a visual impression of
whether changing growth is reﬂected in changing output/income ratios. One can observe
from Figure 4 that a region with high relative growth such as Sachsen of Germany have
experienced an increasing output/income ratio. London of the UK is an example where
relative growth went down 1% yearly and output/income ratio went from 1.15 to 1.05.31
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviations (across the 14 countries) of the dependent
and independent variables used in our country-level regression and also the averages of three
institutional variables that will be used as interaction terms—these institutional variables
are not available by region. The GDP/GNI ratio has a mean of about 1 and has a standard
deviation of 0.04. A value of, e.g., 1.04 means that 4 percent of value produced shows up
as income in other countries on net. Capital inﬂows (the sum of current accounts with sign
reversed) and net assets have large standard deviations of 34 and 9 percent, respectively.
GDP growth 1992–1994 has a standard deviation of about 1 percent. Average population
size of the NUTS2 regions varies from a low of 870,000 in Austria to a high of 3.32 million
in Portugal. We report the mean values of principal components for the institutional quality
indicators, “property rights institutions,” “legal regulations,” and “ﬁnancial regulations.”
The value of the principal components are not interpretable but we report these numbers
chieﬂy to evaluate the variation and we see that the ﬁnancial regulations variable shows the
highest variation across countries.32
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for NUTS2 regions of every country. Within coun-
tries, the output/income ratio shows larger variation compared with that found between
countries, except for Italy and Spain. (The country-level average value of the income/output
31Such patterns are more clear for U.S. data, see Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sørensen, and Yosha (2007).
32A principal component for a group of variables is the variable that is a linear function of the original
variables and maximize the variation over time. While it doesn’t have a very clean interpretation it is a
commonly used method to summarize information in a group of variables that are not practical to all include
in a regression.
19ratio is not going to aﬀect our regression results which all include dummy variables for each
country.) Average GDP is fairly similar across countries with Spain being in the low range
and Portugal having substantially lower output than other countries. Per capita growth from
1991 to 1994 varies from negative in Spain, Italy, and Sweden, to 8.32 percent in Germany.
Trust is highest in the Netherlands and Germany and lowest in Italy and France. Trust
shows the highest variation within Spain. Conﬁdence is highest in Portugal and lowest in
Germany and Spain with Germany showing the largest amount of variation. This is partly
due to several regions in the former DDR displaying low conﬁdence. Factor shares show some
variation, especially the share of manufacturing which is 23 percent in the UK but only 9
percent in Portugal who also have the largest share of agriculture. The fraction of retirees
is largest in Sweden and lowest in Portugal. Measured by population regions are smallest in
Belgium and the Netherlands and largest in Portugal.
4.3 Correlation between Regressors
Tables 3 and 4 display the matrix of correlations between the regressors (and the regressand)
in levels and in changes for countries and NUTS2 regions, respectively. For countries, past
capital inﬂows (cumulated current account deﬁcits) and net asset variables are negatively
correlated and so are past growth and the output/income ratio. Current growth and the
output/income ratio are very highly correlated but this may reﬂect that these numbers are
constructed using the exact same output series.
For NUTS2 regions most correlations are fairly small, the highest correlations being the
output/income ratio with ﬁnance share at 0.43 and ﬁnance share with manufacturing share
at –0.32. Note that the social capital variables, trust and conﬁdence, have a correlation of
only 0.04. Growth has been high in regions with high conﬁdence but not in regions with
high trust.
205 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Does the output/income ratio capture past current accounts?
We perform regressions where countries are the units of observation in order to establish
that the ratio of output to income is a reasonable measure of past capital ﬂows. We can
check this because current accounts and asset holdings are available at the country level
but not at the regional level. In Table 5, we examine the relations between past current
accounts, net asset holdings and output/income ratios. We show results with and without
Ireland since Ireland is well known to have a substantially more open economy than most
other countries; however, the Irish data may also have some problems due to tax arbitrage of
multinational corporations. In the ﬁrst two columns, we examine if net foreign asset holdings
are correlated with past current accounts. As expected, we ﬁnd a positive relation—with
or without Ireland—with signiﬁcance levels of about 5 percent. We further examine if past
current accounts are negatively correlated with the ratio of output to income in the next two
columns. We ﬁnd the expected negative relation when Ireland is left out, but a non-signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient when Ireland is included. While our focus is on EU countries, in the last
two columns we verify that past current accounts typically predict negative output asset
ratios using a sample of 24 OECD countries. We ﬁnd in the last column that such a relation
is highly signiﬁcant statistically, even though Ireland is a strong outlier that including her
brings the level of signiﬁcance down below the 5 percent level. Overall, the results of Table 5
conﬁrm that the income/output ratio is able to capture past current accounts even though
countries with strongly divergent growth patterns, such as Ireland, may obscure the pattern.
5.2 Capital Flows between EU countries
In Table 6, we examine the prediction that relatively high output growth leads to an increase
in the output/income ratio. When Ireland is included in the sample, we ﬁnd a coeﬃcient
of 0.35 which is exactly the predicted magnitude. The coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant and
the reason can be inferred from the second column which shows that when Ireland is left
21out, the positive relation totally disappears and high growth countries show no tendency to
attract capital from other countries. Columns (3) and (4) include population growth and the
lagged ratio of output/income. When Ireland is included, we ﬁnd a very large coeﬃcient to
population growth, which indicates strong immigration of individuals with low assets (likely
young people) who contribute more to output than to income (although the coeﬃcient is
imprecisely estimated and the point estimate seems too big to be meaningful). We ﬁnd that,
when Ireland is left out, the output/income ratio reverts almost fully to unity in the absence
of further shocks but this ﬁnding is likely due to the small overall amount of capital ﬂows.
In columns (5) and (6), we examine if high growth is associated with large current account
deﬁcits and we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant patterns. In the last two columns of Table 6, we regress
the level of the output/income ratio on output and ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient near
0. These ﬁndings are consistent with the well-known observation of Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) that saving and investment are highly correlated at the country level.33 Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2002) point out that in recent years the developing economies of Greece and
and Portugal have received large capital inﬂows and suggest that this might herald the “end
of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle” at least within the EU, but our results indicate that the
process still may need some time before capital adjusts as freely as between U.S. states.34
5.3 Change Regressions: NUTS2 Regions
5.3.1 Tests for Pooling
Our regressions using NUTS2 regions are all performed with a dummy variable included for
each country. Country-level capital ﬂows do not appear to follow the open economy model
well due to reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. By including the dummies all
our results have the interpretation of capturing within country ﬂows rendering any country
33In our model, a productivity shock leads to capital inﬂows; i.e., investment, ﬁnanced by the entire EU
(if integrated) while the savings rate is constant. Therefore, savings and investment are not correlated.
34See also Abiad et al. (2007) who ﬁnd results similar to those of Blancard and Giavazzi in the sense that
capital in Europe ﬂows “downhill” from rich countries to poor countries in accordance with the neoclassical
model.
22speciﬁc feature irrelevant. The patterns of within country capital ﬂows may be similar in
diﬀerent countries, in which case we can pool the countries. We are mainly interested in
whether high growth regions attract capital and whether high output regions are net debtors
or creditors. We will turn to the latter question later but we present all tests for pooling in
Table 7. The ﬁrst two columns show regressions of the change in the output/income ratio
on growth and the last two columns treat the regression of the level of the output/income
ratio on the initial level of output.
In the ﬁrst column, we allow for the coeﬃcient to initial growth to vary across countries.
The point estimates vary substantially by country but the country-level intercepts are not
precisely estimated. In the second column, we impose the restriction that the coeﬃcient
to initial growth is identical in all regions, independently of country. We ﬁnd that this
restriction can be accepted statistically.35 In the third column, we see that net capital ﬂows
between regions display large diﬀerences between countries. There is a strong tendency
for regions with high output to have a high output/income ratio in the Netherlands and
Belgium, a signiﬁcant but somewhat lower tendency in Austria, France, Germany, Sweden,
and the UK. In Portugal and Spain, there is no tendency for the output/income ratio to
be related to output, while in Italy the estimated coeﬃcient is positive and tiny but very
precisely estimated. In column (4), we show the coeﬃcients to output when the Netherlands
and Belgium are pooled into a “North1” group, Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK
are grouped into a “North2” group, and Italy, Portugal, and Spain are combined into a
“South” group. Countries can be accepted statistically to be identical with each of these
groups.36 There are clear diﬀerences in the patterns of net capital ﬂows between northern
and southern Europe which will be explored in the next Section.
35We calculate an F-statistic of 0.77, which is below the F(148,9) 5 percent critical value of 1.94 (148 is
the number of observations minus the number of parameters estimated in the unconstrained model and 9 is
the number of restrictions imposed in the constrained model).
36We calculate an F-statistic, ﬁnding a value of 2.00. The F-statistic is below the F(148,7) 5 percent
critical value of 2.07 implying that this hypothesis is not rejected.
235.3.2 Change Regressions, Population Growth, and Lagged Output/Income
Table 8 displays the pooled coeﬃcient to initial growth in the ﬁrst column. The coeﬃcient
is positive and signiﬁcant, consistent with high growth regions receiving capital from other
regions in the country. However, the coeﬃcient is clearly (and statistically signiﬁcantly)
below 0.33 indicating that capital ownership is not fully diversiﬁed within EU countries. In
the second column, we add population growth and ﬁnd a negative (not quite signiﬁcant)
coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient may indicate that migration is dominated by high net worth
residents, possibly retirees. Finally, we include the initial level of the output/income ratio
and ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient consistent with mean reversion, although the coeﬃcient is
smaller than expected and not quite signiﬁcant.
Why may EU countries have less integrated regions than the United States? There are
few formal barriers to capital ﬂows between regions within EU countries but we suspect
that ﬁnancial and industrial development may explain the diﬀerences. If EU countries have
more independent farmers and proprietor-owned small ﬁrms we might expect regional in-
come to be tighter related to regional output than in the United States where more ﬁrms
are incorporated and listed on exchanges where ownership shares are traded in nationwide
market. Financial development may, however, also matter for small ﬁrms, for example, if
nationwide insurance companies insure the value of farm output against, say, hail damage,
the insurance companies to some extent become “owners” of a part of output. “Insurance”
of the value of output through trading on futures markets for hogs or grains have a similar
eﬀect and even nationwide banks to some extent share in output by giving loans to small
ﬁrms—even if loans have a ﬁxed interest rate the repayment become partly state-contingent
if the loans are not repaid due to default in periods of low output. We do not attempt
to directly measure diﬀerences in these types of ﬁnancial instruments between the United
States and Europe—maybe such a task is infeasible—but our hunch is such diﬀerences are
behind the divergence of the U.S. and EU results.
245.3.3 Regional Social Capital and Within Country Financial Integration
We turn to the major focus of our investigation, namely whether trust and conﬁdence are
important determinants of capital mobility. We address this question by interacting the
level of trust or conﬁdence with initial growth. If the coeﬃcient to the interacted variable is
positive this indicates that capital ﬂows more readily to high growth regions in areas within
countries where the level of trust (conﬁdence) is high and capital leaves slow growth regions
more rapidly. We also include conﬁdence and trust in non-interacted form because a potential
left-out non-interacted variable might spuriously make the interaction term signiﬁcant. We
present the correlation matrix for our variables in Table 9. We can observe, among other
things, that trust and conﬁdence are positively correlated, as also found in the previous
sample, but the two variables measure quite diﬀerent things as the correlation is only 0.22. In
general, the correlations between these regressors are fairly low implying that the regression
analysis should be able to identify the eﬀect of the individual variables.
Table 10 presents the regression of the change in the output/income ratio on initial growth
and initial growth interacted. We ﬁnd with a 10 percent level of signiﬁcance that regions
with higher conﬁdence tend to have a lower output/income ratio; i.e., export capital to other
regions. This result is not unreasonable but given the borderline level of signiﬁcance and
because it is hard to verify the robustness of this result we hesitate to stress it. Our main
object of interest is the interaction term and we here ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of
the expected sign: capital ﬂows much more freely from low to high growth regions in areas
of high conﬁdence. The t-statistic is a high 3.88 and the coeﬃcient implies that the regions
with the highest conﬁdence37 (a logged and demeaned value of 0.38) has a coeﬃcient to
growth of 0.24*0.38+0.19=0.28—very close to the expected value from our benchmark model.
Individuals need to feel conﬁdent in the institutions that provide ﬁnancial intermediation, in
the ultimate recipients of capital, and in the legal system, so the result is perfectly intuitive
and in support of Guiso et al. (2004) and (2005).
37The demeaned interaction term for conﬁdence has a range from –0.71 to 0.38 and the range for trust is
from –1.81 to 0.79.
25Alternatively, in column (3), we use trust as an interaction variable. We ﬁnd the expected
sign for this variable with a signiﬁcance level of between 5 and 10 percent but the point
estimate is substantially lower than that found for conﬁdence. In columns (4)-(6) we include
the lagged output/income ratio and population growth but these variables appear quite
orthogonal to the interaction terms and do not change the results.
In Table 11, we include the trust and conﬁdence variables together. Trust now becomes
less signiﬁcant while the conﬁdence variable is estimated at the same order of magnitude
and still with high signiﬁcance—clearly the data can separate between these two variables
and clearly conﬁdence matters more.38
Table 12 examines robustness. We ﬁrst examine if the estimated eﬀect of conﬁdence is
sensitive to the exact choice of questions asked. One might expect that conﬁdence in such
institutions as parliament, major companies, and the justice system might be more important
for ﬁnancial integration. We therefore in column (1) show the regression obtained using a
“core conﬁdence” measure constructed from the subjects expressing conﬁdence in these three
institutions. The coeﬃcient to the interaction term is smaller than for the “full” conﬁdence
index, maybe reﬂecting more noise when averaging over a lower number of variables, but
the coeﬃcient is still clearly signiﬁcant. Also, the range of the “core conﬁdence” measure is
larger implying that the smaller coeﬃcient only partly implies less variation explained.39
One might worry that social capital can be endogenous to economic development. In this
case our results simply reﬂect that high growth, or more developed, regions have high trust
and also a high level of ﬁnancial integration between themselves. In order to examine if the
interaction of conﬁdence and initial growth may act as a “stand-in” for an interaction of, say,
high output and initial growth, we include an interaction term of initial output and growth
and see if this renders the interaction of conﬁdence and growth insigniﬁcant. The results
are clearly at odds with this idea, the interaction term with initial output is very small with
a minuscule t-value. Alternatively, we include a squared term in growth. If conﬁdence and
38It is feasible that conﬁdence simply is more precisely measured as the index of conﬁdence is based on
the answer to 11 questions while the index of trust is based on 2 questions.
39The range of the demeaned core conﬁdence measure is from –1.22 to 0.41.
26growth are correlated and the relation between output/income and growth is non-linear the
interaction term might simply capture a left-out quadratic term.40 However, the data do not
support a quadratic term in growth. The regressions using trust as the interaction terms are
also robust to these potential problems.41
5.3.4 Country Institutions and within Country Financial Integration
The quality of institutions in a country may be crucial for the patterns of capital ﬂows. We
have three sets of indices for the institutional environment, namely principal components
for variables measuring the security of property rights, the quality of the legal system, and
regulations aﬀecting ﬁnancial markets directly. The variables are available to us by country
only and our main goal is to examine if these institutional indices might explain why some
countries are more ﬁnancially integrated within than others; i.e., we use the country-level
indices interacted with regional-level initial growth or (in the levels regressions) with the
initial regional output level.42 Table 13 shows the correlation matrix for the interacted
indices with each other and with initial growth and output and with the change and level of
the output/income ratio. The most notable correlation is the one between property rights
institutions interacted with growth (initial output) and legal regulations at 0.85 (0.89).
We report results for institutional indices in Table 14. These results have a diﬀerent
interpretation than the regressions involving trust and conﬁdence where we searched for
diﬀerences between regions. Here we attempt only to ﬁnd diﬀerences between countries in
the patterns of within-country interregional capital ﬂows. However, none of the indices are
40See Ozer-Balli and Sørensen (2007) about potential problems in the use of interaction terms.
41Another worry might be reverse causality although it is not so obvious why the interaction of growth with
attitudes might be caused by net capital ﬂows. In an attempt to examine this issue we try to instrument the
social capital variables with religious composition and got signiﬁcant results—however, the point estimates
are large and hence hard to interpret. We do not tabulate these results.
42Guiso et al. (2004) measure domestic ﬁnancial development for Italian regions as the probability that
the household will be shut out from the credit market. They ﬁnd that local ﬁnancial development matters
for ﬁrm growth even in a de-jure integrated market such as Italy. Their Feldstein-Horioka regressions show
positive correlations between saving and investment for Italian regions, which makes Italy a de-facto non-
integrated market. They interpret this as follows: even if money easily can be moved from a bank in Milan
to a bank in Naples, it can not ﬁnance projects in Naples without the help of a local intermediary who
screens good from bad projects.
27signiﬁcant in explaining diﬀerences in diversiﬁcation. Of course, this is consistent with the
test reported in Table 7 where the assumption of identical slopes across countries could not
be rejected.
5.4 Level regressions: Net capital Flows across NUTS2 Regions
Our results in Table 7 indicate large diﬀerences in net ownership between countries in north-
ern and southern Europe. To recapitulate: in Belgium and the Netherlands (“North1”) high
output regions are debtors, in Austria, France, Germany, and the UK (“North2”) this is also
true but the pattern is less strong and in Italy, Portugal, and Spain (“South”) we ﬁnd no
correlation between output and the output/income ratio.
5.4.1 Does Trust and Conﬁdence Explain Net Capital Flows Across Regions?
Table 15 examines if the diﬀerences between net ﬂows in the north and south of Europe can
be explained by diﬀerences in trust and conﬁdence. The ﬁrst column shows the regression
with the two North dummies, redone for the smaller sample where the trust and conﬁdence
variables are available. The econometric setup is slightly diﬀerent here than in Table 7. Here,
we include initial income and initial income interacted with the North1 and North2 dummies
rather than initial income interacted with each of the three dummies. The coeﬃcient to
initial income will be the same as to the South dummy in the previous table but now the
coeﬃcients to the North dummies captures the diﬀerence between these regions and the
South regions. The reason for this change is that we are interested in testing if the inclusion
of variables, such as conﬁdence, may explain the diﬀerences between countries and in the
present formulation a variable can be said to explain the diﬀerence between the countries if
it makes the interaction of initial output with the North1 or North2 dummies insigniﬁcant
as measured by the t-statistic. On the contrary, if the regression with both dummy variables
and, say, conﬁdence shows signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the North dummies and an insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient to conﬁdence then conﬁdence cannot be said to explain the north/south pattern—
28it may be part of the explanation but not the full explanation.
In column (1), we present the regression of the output/income ratio on initial output
and initial output multiplied by the North1 and North2 dummies. Country dummies are
also included but not displayed. For this sample the coeﬃcient to initial output (i.e., the
non-interacted term) is positive and insigniﬁcant but both the North1 and North2 dummies
are signiﬁcant indicating a larger tendency for capital to ﬂow to high output states in the
northern countries. Including an interaction term for conﬁdence results in a positive coeﬃ-
cient but it is not signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Including the term together with the
North1 and North2 dummies renders the coeﬃcient very small. Trust has a small coeﬃcient
in column (4) but a negative coeﬃcient when the North/South dummies are included. Over-
all, conﬁdence and trust do not seem to explain the relation between regional output and
net capital ﬂows.
5.4.2 Do Country Level Institutions and Regulations Explain the Diﬀerence
between Northern and Southern Europe?
In Table 16, which uses the full sample of 168 regions, we examine the role of institutions
related to 1) property rights such as corruption or expropriation risk), 2) legal variables
such as duration of check collection or enforceability of contracts, and 3) ﬁnancial regulation
variables such as investor protection and disclosure requirements.43 In order to summa-
rize the information within each group of institutional variables, we calculate the principal
components which summarize the information in the constituent variables. Table 16 shows
the results when the principal component is interacted with initial output and the regres-
sion is done with or without the North dummy interactions. (The principal component in
non-interacted form are not included as they would be perfectly collinear with the country
dummies.) We ﬁnd that property rights are highly signiﬁcant with high output regions in
countries with good property rights being net debtors consistent with capital moving to high
output regions in countries with better property rights. When we include the North dum-
43See Table 22 in the appendix for the complete list.
29mies we see that the property rights principal component can explain the diﬀerence between
North2 countries and South countries (and the diﬀerence to the North1 counties of Belgium
and the Netherlands become slightly smaller). Legal variables are highly signiﬁcant when
the North dummies are not included but clearly not signiﬁcant when they are—it appears
that the legal variables are not the full explanation of North/South diﬀerences. Financial
regulation variables are not signiﬁcant even when the North/South dummies are left out and
do not appear to explain net capital ﬂows.
It is somewhat hard to interpret principal components so, in Table 17, we study the role
of the property right variables in more detail. Ideally, one would like to know which of the
5 components of “property rights” are the relevant ones for capital ﬂows and a multiple
regression that allows for all the variables in the same regression should point to the more
important variable or variables. Due to the high collinearity we didn’t get signiﬁcant ro-
bust results in such regressions. (This is to be expected because we are trying to infer this
from the diﬀerence between 8 countries and with 5 components, which leaves few degrees
of freedom.) We, therefore, in Table 17 examine which components have explanatory power
for capital ﬂows when the components are included one-by-one. When the North dummies
are left out all components are signiﬁcant so we cannot rule out that all the components
may play a role. However, when we include the North dummies we ﬁnd that the Bureau-
cratic Quality variable is no longer signiﬁcant. Likely, this variable is less important. The
No Corruption variable changes sign and the coeﬃcient to the North1 interacted dummy
becomes very large which indicates that the No Corruption variable is too highly correlated
with this variable to be estimated precisely. Therefore, we doubt that the negative estimated
coeﬃcient is meaningful. Law and Order, No Expropriation Risk, and Government Stabil-
ity all remain signiﬁcant when the dummies are included, and each of these variables have
enough explanatory power to render the North2 variable insigniﬁcant. In other words, these
variables all have the potential to explain the diﬀerence in the patterns of within-country
capital ﬂows in the south and the north of Europe. Unfortunately, we cannot separate out
if one (or more) of these three variables is the more important variable(s).
305.5 Net Capital Flows and Industrial Structure
In Table 18, we explore if net capital tends to ﬂow to regions with a certain industrial
structure. We explore this by including in the regressions the regions’ share of manufacturing,
agriculture, ﬁnance, and mining, respectively. In steady state the output/income ratio is
unity and the factor shares would only be signiﬁcant if recent productivity changes have
favored a sector in relative terms. We see that only the share of agriculture is signiﬁcant, with
a negative coeﬃcient. This might reﬂect that agricultural regions have become relatively less
productive and capital has been ﬂowing to other regions. However, in the case of agriculture
it is well known that the EU provides extensive income support to farmers under the Common
Agricultural Policy and we suspect that this is reﬂected in the output/income ratio. Next,
we examine if high output regions tend to have attracted more outside capital if they are
focused in a particular sector. We examine this question by interacting the sector share
with initial output. We ﬁnd a large positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient to the interaction of
ﬁnance share and initial output consistent with high growth areas concentrating in ﬁnance
having attracted outside capital. The coeﬃcients to the interactions with manufacture and
agriculture are negative and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level indicating that high output
manufacturing or agricultural regions on average are capital exporters. Finally, we ﬁnd a
positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient to the interaction of mining share with initial output. This is
not surprising, regions that see an increase in the value of oil or minerals typically attract
capital with little delay.
5.6 The Role of Government Subsidies and Taxes
Our data set allows us to use personal income pre-tax and transfers, as we have done so
far, but we also have data for disposable income deﬁned as personal income minus taxes
plus transfers. An analysis of whether the patterns of income ﬂows diﬀers according to the
income deﬁnition will help us understand the role of government income transfers in cross-
ownership across within-country regions. We perform regressions (without interaction terms)
of the output/income ratio on sector shares and including the share of retirees and migration.
31Such regressions, and in particular, the comparison of the results for income versus disposable
income will elucidate whether governments channel income ﬂows to regions dominated by
certain industries. Because we could not statistically pool the countries we perform the
regressions for the North1, North2, and South groups of countries one by one.
5.6.1 Belgium and the Netherlands
Table 19 analyzes the North1 group of countries. We ﬁnd that the output/income ratio is
robustly related to output levels but this is partly explained by industrial structure: large
ﬁnancial, manufacturing, and mining shares all predict a high output/income ratio. Migra-
tion and retirement are not signiﬁcant but we see a lower output/income ratio in regions
with many retirees in the last column consistent with retirees receiving substantial transfers.
5.6.2 Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK
As shown in Table 20, for the North2 countries the relation between the output/income
ratio and output is robustly estimated and none of the indicators of industrial structure are
signiﬁcant. It is not obvious why sectoral structure matters in Belgium and the Netherlands
and not in the North2 countries but exploring this topic will take us too far aﬁeld. The
impact of retirement is positive and insigniﬁcant when income does not include transfers but
turns signiﬁcantly negative when transfers are included, consistent with retirees contributing
little to output but receiving government transfers. Migration has large negative coeﬃcients
which seems to indicate that migrants arriving with high savings are more important for
patterns on income ﬂows.
5.6.3 Italy and Spain
Table 21 shows that in Italy and Spain there is a signiﬁcant but very weak relation between
the output/income ratio and output. The eﬀect of industrial structure depends strongly
on the income concept used: regions with a large ﬁnancial sector have low output/income
ratios before taxes and transfers but high output/income ratios after taxes and transfers.
32Mechanically this means that regions with large ﬁnancial sectors pay relatively high net
taxes. The share of mining is insigniﬁcant for primary income but positive and signiﬁcant for
income after taxes indicating these regions pay high taxes. The share of mining turns strongly
negative and signiﬁcant when income after taxes and transfers are used which indicates that
mining regions receive large income transfers that dominates the eﬀect of taxes. Italy and
Spain are not large oil producers and the coal mining industry in Spain is struggling to be
competitive and government transfers play an important role in income maintenance. In Italy
various minerals are mined and it appears that government transfers also here are important.
The results for agriculture are consistent with agricultural regions paying relatively low taxes
and receiving large transfers. We ﬁnd that retirees receive positive transfers, while migration
in Italy and Spain has the opposite sign of that found for the North2 countries indicating
that low net worth individuals may be dominating migration in Italy and Spain.
6 Conclusion
Culture matters for ﬁnancial integration. We showed that ownership of capital for European
regions are less than fully diversiﬁed within countries (not to speak of between countries)
but for regions with high conﬁdence or trust the level of ﬁnancial integration is consistent
with full integration.
We ﬁnd large net capital ﬂows to high productivity regions within countries of northern
Europe, whereas we ﬁnd weak evidence for regions of southern Europe. The diﬀerences in
the ﬁndings for the northern and southern countries are correlated with variables such as
expropriation risk, government stability, and law and order. However, these variables do not
fully explain the diﬀerences. In Italy and Spain net income ﬂows appear to be inﬂuenced
signiﬁcantly by patterns of government taxes and transfers.
337 Data
7.1 Statistical Regions of Europe and Data Sources
Due to increasing demand for regional statistical data, Eurostat set up the system of “Nomen-
clature of Statistical Territorial Units” (NUTS) as a single, coherent regional breakdown of
the European Union. This division is also used for distribution of the Structural Funds to
regions whose development is lagging behind. For practical reasons of data availability and
policy implementations, the division favors the “normative criteria” which are based on po-
litical will, and ﬁxed boundaries stated by member countries, rather than some “functional
criteria” which speciﬁes the regional breakdown with geographical criteria such as altitude
or soil type, or by economic and social criteria such as the homogeneity, complementarity,
or polarization of regional economies. NUTS subdivides each member state into a number
of regions at the NUTS1 level. Each of these is then subdivided into regions at NUTS level
2, and these in turn into regions at NUTS level 3. The minimum and maximum thresholds
for the average population size of the NUTS regions at each level is reported below.
Thresholds for the Average Size of NUTS Regions
Level Minimum Maximum
NUTS1 3 million 7 million
NUTS2 800 000 3 million
NUTS3 150 000 800 000
Data sources are the Eurostat electronic database, the World Bank World Development
Indicators (WDI), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006),44, the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG), various papers for institutional variables cited in the descriptions, and the World
Values Survey data for social capital regressions. For regional regressions, we use the data
from Eurostat. WDI and LM data are used for the country level current account regressions.
44Henceforth LM data.
347.2 Regional Data for Level and Change Regressions
Availability of output and population data for the initial years 1991-1994 to calculate the
initial per capita output, and Gross Domestic Product and Personal Income at the regional
level to calculate output/income ratio for years 1995–2003 are the main criteria for the spec-
iﬁcation of the regions. By considering this constraint, we make the following changes to the
original NUTS1 and NUTS2 speciﬁcation:
NUTS1:
We delete the FR9 region, which is the overseas French region. Due to the availability of
data, we also exclude Luxembourg. Total number of NUTS1 regions we have in our dataset
is 70. A list of the regions in the dataset is given at the end of this section.
NUTS2:
4 NUTS2 regions that are part of the FR9 NUTS1 region and Luxembourg is deleted from
the NUTS2 level data. Another important aspect here is the missing data for NUTS2 regions.
Each NUTS1 region consists of a number of NUTS2 sub-regions. In the case of missing data
to calculate initial output between 1991-1994 or output/income ratio between 1995-2003 for
NUTS2 regions, we do the following speciﬁcations to organize NUTS2 level data.
First, if we don’t have any data for NUTS2 regions of a particular NUTS1 region, we drop
these NUTS2 regions and use the data for the NUTS1 region which contains these NUTS2
regions. Those regions are as follows:
DE4 = DE41+DE42 (Brandenburg = Brandenburg Nordost + Brandenburg - S¨ udwest)
DEA = DEA1+ DEA2+ DEA3+ DEA4+ DEA5 ( Nordrhein-Westfalen = D¨ usseldorf +
K¨ oln + M¨ unster + Detmold + Arnsberg )
DED = DED1+ DED2+ DED3 (Sachsen = Chemnitz + Dresden + Leipzig)
IE0 = IE01+ IE02 (Ireland = Border, Midlands and Western + Southern and Eastern)
35FI1 = FI13+FI18+FI19+FI1A (Manner-Suomi = It¨ a-Suomi + Etel¨ a-Suomi + L¨ ansi-Suomi
+Pohjois-Suomi )
PT1 = PT11+PT15+PT16+PT17+PT18 ( Continente = Norte + Centro + Lisboa + Alen-
tejo + Algarve)
UKI = UKI1+UKI2 (London= Inner London + Outer London)
UKL = UKL1+UKL2 (Wales = West Wales and The Valleys + East Wales )
UKM = UKM1 + UKM2 + UKM3 + UKM4 ( Scotland = North Eastern Scotland+ East-
ern Scotland + South Western Scotland + Highlands and Islands)
Secondly, another speciﬁcation is done when we do not have data for some of the NUTS2
sub-regions of a NUTS1 region, but we have the data for the corresponding NUTS1 region.
We drop the NUTS2 regions with missing data and deﬁne a new region as the “rest of the
NUTS1 region.” 3 regions are deﬁned as follows:
Rest of ES6 or (ES63+ ES64) = ES6 - ES61 -ES62
(Ciudad Aut´ onoma de Ceuta (ES) + Ciudad Aut´ onoma de Melilla (ES))
Rest of ITD or (ITD1+ ITD2) = ITD - ITD3 - ITD4 - ITD5
(Provincia Autonoma Bolzano-Bozen + Provincia Autonoma Trento)
Rest of SE0 or (SE09+ SE0A) = SE0 - SE01 - SE02- SE04 - SE06 - SE07 - SE08
(Sm˚ aland med ¨ oarna + V¨ astsverige)
After these changes, the total number of NUTS2 regions we have in our data set is 185.
Gross Regional Product: GRP is Gross Regional Product for NUTS1 and NUTS2 re-
gions. This data is collected from two sources. The ﬁrst part is received from the internal
Eurostat database by request, and contains the 1991-1994 period according to the ESA79
system,45 which we use to calculate the initial output for the 1991-1994 period. After 1995,
45In the European System of Accounts ESA79 takes 1979 and ESA95 takes 1995 as the reference year in
the national accounts.
36data is published according to ESA95 standards and available as a public database. Data is
reported in ECU until 1998 and after 1999 all series are in Euros.
Gross Domestic Product: Collected from the same sources as regional level GDP data
to calculate the GDP/GNI ratio. We use real per capita GDP series at constant 2000 US
dollars for initial output and initial growth calculations for country level regressions.
Gross National Income: GNI at the country level is taken from the Eurostat database to
calculate the output/income ratio for 1995-2003.
Regional Personal Income: RPI is the income of households for NUTS1 and NUTS2
regions. We use the term personal income but more precisely we use what is called “Pri-
mary Income” in the dataset. Primary income is the compensation of employees received
plus mixed income (or the operating surplus from their own-account production of hous-
ing services) of resident households, plus property income received minus property income
payable by resident households. Note that primary income diﬀers from the usual deﬁnition
of personal income which usually includes transfers.
Regional Personal Disposable Income: We construct an “Intermediate Income” level as
primary income − taxes. “Disposable income” is the income level after taxes and transfers
which is primary income − taxes + transfers.
Population: Annual average population data from Eurostat.
Total Value Added: Gross value added at basic prices series is used.
Sector Shares: 1995 is taken as the initial year to compute the sector shares. We have a full
set of data on sectoral activity for NUTS1 regions, but data is not complete for NUTS2 re-
37gions. The International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic Activities(ISIC)
is the international standard for classiﬁcation by economic activities. It is used to classify
each enterprise according to its primary activity. The primary activity is deﬁned in that
activity that generates the most value added. NACE46 is the compatible EU equivalent.
Eurostat uses NACE classiﬁcation to report sectoral data. NACE classiﬁcation for sectors
is reported in the table. Sectors we used for the regressions are as follows:
Agriculture share: Ratio of “A B Agriculture, hunting, forestry and ﬁshing” NACE branch
to the total value added from the Eurostat database. Data for all regions are available in
NUTS1, NUTS2 and country level.
Mining share: Ratio of “C Mining and Quarrying” NACE branch to the total value added
from the Eurostat database. Data for Denmark and Germany data are missing at the
NUTS1, NUTS2, and country levels.
Manufacturing: Ratio of “D Manufacturing” NACE branch to the total value added from
the Eurostat database. Data for Denmark and Germany data are missing at the NUTS1,
NUTS2, and country levels.
Finance: Ratio of “J Financial Intermediation” NACE branch to the total value added from
the Eurostat database. Data for Denmark and Germany data are missing at the NUTS1,
NUTS2, and country levels.
Retirement: The share of population over age 65 is used. Average of the years 1992-
1994 are used due to availability of data. All regions are available in NUTS1 and country
level, Germany, Ireland, Finland and ukk3 (Cornwall and Isles of Scilly) and ukk4 (Devon)
regions from UK is missing at the NUTS2 level.
46Nomenclature g´ en´ erale des Activit´ es Economiques dans les Communaut´ es Europ´ eenes– - General Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities within the European Communities
38Migration: Net migration is calculated by subtracting the departures from the arrivals.
We use the internal migration which is the movements within the country. When we sum
up net migration of the regions for a particular country we ﬁnd zero. Data is not available
for Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Portugal, Finland and ukk3 (Cornwall and
Isles of Scilly) and ukk4 (Devon) regions from UK. We use the 1992-1994 average share of
population who migrated over 1992-1994 by excluding these missing regions.
7.3 Country Level Data
Net assets: Data is based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) dataset. Assets and liabilities
are available under the categories of portfolio equities, foreign direct investment, debt and
ﬁnancial derivatives. Total liabilities is the sum of these categories. Total assets include
total reserves besides these assets. Net assets are the diﬀerence between the total assets and
total liabilities of the particular country, and they enter the regressions as a ratio of GDP.
Current Account: The current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods and
services, income, and current transfers. Data is from the World Development Indicators,
reported in terms of current US dollars.
GDP and GNI data at country level for these regressions are also collected from WDI
dataset.
Property Rights Institutions: The data source is the ICRG variables from the PRS
Group. The ICRG model for forecasting ﬁnancial, economic, and political risk was created
in 1980 by the editors of “International Reports,” a weekly newsletter on international ﬁnance
and economics. The editors created a statistical model to calculate country risks, which later
turned into a comprehensive system that enables measuring and comparing various types of
39country level economic and political risks. In 1992, ICRG (its editor and analysts) moved
from “International Reports” to “The PRS Group.” Now, “The PRS Group” professional
staﬀ assigns scores for each category to each country. We use the average of 1991-1994 data.
No Corruption: Assessment of corruption within the political system. Average yearly
rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk.
Law and Order: The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impar-
tiality of the legal system; the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance
of the law. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk.
Government Stability: The government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s),
and its ability to stay in oﬃce. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score
means lower risk.
Bureaucratic Quality: Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another
shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Aver-
age yearly rating from 0 to 4, where a higher score means lower risk.
No Expropriation Risk: This is an assessment of factors aﬀecting the risk to invest-
ment that are not covered by other political, economic and ﬁnancial risk components. It is
the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum
score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to
Very High Risk. The subcomponents are: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Proﬁts Repa-
triation, Payment Delays.
Legal System Regulations:
Total duration of checks collection: Data is based on the calculations of Djankov et al.
40(2003). The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure under the factual
and procedural assumptions provided. It is the sum of: (i) duration until completion of
service of process, (ii) duration of trial, and (iii) duration of enforcement.
Duration of enforcement: Data is based on the calculations of Djankov et al. (2003).
Duration of enforcement (from notiﬁcation to actual enforcement) is the estimated duration,
in calendar days, between the moment of issuance of judgement and the moment the land-
lord repossesses the property (for the eviction case) or the creditor obtains payment (for the
check collection case).
Formalism index: Data is based on the calculations of Djankov et al. (2003). The index
measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level
civil trial courts, and is formed by adding up the following indices: (i) professionals vs.
laymen, (ii) written vs. oral elements, (iii) legal justiﬁcation, (iv) statutory regulation of
evidence, (v) control of superior review, (vi) engagement formalities, and (vii) independent
procedural actions. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control
or intervention in the judicial process.
Enforceability of contracts: Data is based on the calculations of Djankov et al. (2003).
The relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and complications pre-
sented by language and mentality diﬀerences. Scale for 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating
higher enforceability.
Creditor Rights: Data is based on the calculations of La Porta et al. (2006). An in-
dex aggregating diﬀerent creditor rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the
country imposes restrictions, such as creditors consent or minimum dividends to ﬁle for
reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are
41ranked ﬁrst in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets
of a bankrupt ﬁrm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property
pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4.
Shareholder Rights: Data is based on the calculations of La Porta et al. (2006). An
index aggregating the shareholder rights which we labeled as anti-director rights. The index
is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote
to the ﬁrm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General
Shareholders Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in
the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary
Shareholders Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) share-
holders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders vote. The index
ranges from 0 to 6.
Financial Regulations:
Disclosure requirements: Data is based on the calculations of La Porta et al. (2006).
The index of disclosure equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Prospect; (2) Compensation; (3)
Shareholders; (4) Inside ownership; (5) Contracts Irregular; (6) and Transactions.
Liability standard: Data is based on the calculations of La Porta et al. (2006). The
index of liability standards equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Liability standard for the
issuer and its directors; (2) Liability standard for the distributor; and (3) Liability standard
for the accountant.
Public enforcement: Data is based on the calculations of La Porta et al. (2006). The
index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics
index; (2) Rule making power index; (3) Investigative powers index; (4) Orders index; and
42(5) Criminal index.
Investor Protection: Data is based on the calculations of La Porta et al. (2006). Princi-
pal component of disclosure, liability standards, and Anti-director rights. Scale from 0 to 10.
Government ownership of banks: Data is based on the calculations of La Porta et al.
(2006). Share of the assets of the top 10 banks in a given country owned by the government
of that country in 1970 and 1995. The percentage of the assets owned by the government in
a given bank is calculated by multiplying the share of each shareholder in that bank by the
share the government owns in that shareholder, and then summing the resulting shares.
7.4 Individual Level Data from World Values Survey
The World Values Survey ﬁrst emerged out of the European Values Study in 1981, when the
methods of a successful European study were extended to 14 countries outside Europe. The
1981 study covered only 22 countries worldwide. After the extension of the survey around
the world, it is coordinated by an organization of a network of social scientists, the World
Values Survey Association.
World Values Surveys were designed to enable a cross-national, cross-cultural comparison of
values and norms on a wide variety of topics and to monitor changes in values and attitudes
across the globe. There are four waves of the World Values Survey carried out 1981-1984,
1990-1993, 1995-1997, and 1999-2004. We use the survey data from the second wave, surveys
conducted 1990–1991, for our sample countries.
Broad topics covered including perception of life, family, work, traditional values, personal
ﬁnances, religion and morale, the economy, politics and society, the environment, allocation
of resources, contemporary social issues, national identity, and technology and its impact on
society. All surveys are carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe
consisting of all adult citizens, ages 18 and older.
We use 15 questions from the survey. We construct a mixed sample of NUTS1 and NUTS2
43regions considering the regional speciﬁcation in World Values Survey. The Dataset uses
NUTS1 regions for Germany, France, Portugal, UK, and NUTS2 regions for Belgium, Spain,
Italy, Netherland, Austria to indicate the location of the individual. As explained below, we
construct regional indices of conﬁdence and trust. The following sections describe the survey
questions and the construction of the indices used in the regressions.
Conﬁdence Index:
Questions 1-11: Conﬁdence Scale of 1 to 4, higher values indicate less conﬁdence in the
institution named in the question. The institution is armed forces in question 1; education
system in question 2; press in question 3; labor unions in question 4; police in question
5; parliament in question 6; the civil services in question 7; the social security system in
question 8; major companies in question 9; justice system in question 10 and the European
Union in question 11.
We take the average of individual responses over the regions, and divide by the maximum
value of the regional averages in our sample. Conﬁdence index is constructed as multiplying
the sum of these rescaled values of regional averages by (−1/11). We reverse the sign in
order to make the interpretation easier. For the ﬁnal value of conﬁdence index, higher values
of conﬁdence index indicates higher conﬁdence.
“Core Conﬁdence” index is constructed based on only questions 5, 8, and 9.
Trust Index:
Question 12 : Most people can be trusted Takes values 1 or 2, 1 means that individual
trusts most people.
Questions 13: Trust: Other people in country Scale of 1 to 5, where lower values
mean more trust.
Average of individual responses over the regions are divided by the maximum value in the
44sample to rescale between 0 and 1. Trust index is constructed using these rescaled regional
series by −1/2∗(Q12+Q13). For the ﬁnal value of trust index, higher values of trust index
indicates higher trust.
Due to data availability, we exclude Centre-Est and Northern Ireland regions from the sample
and construct a sample of 105 regions to perform our analysis.
45NACE Classiﬁcation
A B Agriculture, hunting, forestry and ﬁshing
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry
B Fishing
C D E Total industry (excluding construction)
C TO F Industry
C Mining and quarrying
D Manufacturing
E Electricity, gas and water supply
F Construction
G TO P Services
G H I Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods; hotels and
restaurants; transport, storage and communication
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods
H Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
J K Financial intermediation; real estate, renting and
business activities
J Financial intermediation
K Real estate, renting and business activities
L TO P Public administration and defence, compulsory social
security; education; health and social work; other
community, social and personal service activities;
private households with employed persons
L Public administration and defence; compulsory social
security
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social, personal service activities
















47List of NUTS1 Regions
BE Belgium(3 regions) FR France (8 regions)
BE1 R´ egion de Bruxelles-Capitale FR1 ˆ Ile de France
Brussels Hoofdstedlijk Gewest FR2 Bassin Parisien
BE2 Vlaams Gewest FR3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais
BE3 R´ egion Wallonne FR4 Est
DK Denmark (1 region) FR5 Ouest
DK0 Denmark FR6 Sud-Ouest
DE Germany (16 regions) FR7 Centre-Est
DE1 Baden-W¨ urttemberg FR8 M´ editerran´ ee
DE2 Bayern IE Ireland (1 region)
DE3 Berlin IE0 Ireland
DE4 Brandenburg IT Italy (5 regions)
DE5 Bremen ITC Nord Ovest
DE6 Hamburg ITD Nord Est
DE7 Hessen ITE Centro (IT)
DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ITF Sud (IT)
DE9 Niedersachsen ITG Isole (IT)
DEA Nordrhein-Westfalen NL Netherlands (4 regions)
DEB Rheinland-Pfalz NL1 Noord-Nederland
DEC Saarland NL2 Oost-Nederland
DED Sachsen NL3 West-Nederland
DEE Sachsen-Anhalt NL4 Zuid-Nederland
DEF Schleswig-Holstein AT Austria (3 regions)
DEG Th¨ uringen AT1 Ost¨ osterreich
GR Greece (4 regions) AT2 S¨ ud¨ osterreich
GR1 Voreia Ellada AT3 West¨ osterreich
GR2 Kentriki Ellada PT Portugal (3 regions)
GR3 Attiki PT1 Continente (PT)
GR4 Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti PT2 Regi˜ ao Aut´ onoma dos A¸ cores (PT)
ES Spain (7 regions) PT3 Regi˜ ao Aut´ onoma da Madeira (PT)
ES1 Noroeste FI Finland (2 regions)
ES2 Noreste FI1 Manner-Suomi
ES3 Comunidad de Madrid FI2 ˚ Aland
ES4 Centro (ES) SE Sweden (1 region)
ES5 Este SE0 Sverige
ES6 Sur
ES7 Canarias (ES)
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UK United Kingdom (12 regions)
UKC North East
UKD North West (including Merseyside)










49List of NUTS2 Regions
BE Belgium(11 regions) DE91 Braunschweig
BE10 R´ egion de Bruxelles-Capitale DE92 Hannover
Brussels Hoofdstedlijk Gewest DE93 L¨ uneburg
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen DE94 Weser-Ems
BE22 Prov. Limburg (B) DEA Nordrhein-Westfalen
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen DEB1 Koblenz
BE24 Prov. Vlaams Brabant DEB2 Trier
BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz
BE31 Prov. Brabant Wallon DEC0 Saarland
BE32 Prov. Hainaut DED Sachsen
BE33 Prov. Li` ege DEE1 Dessau
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg (B) DEE2 Halle
BE35 Prov. Namur DEE3 Magdeburg
DK Denmark (1 region) DEF0 Schleswig-Holstein
DK00 Denmark DEG0 Th¨ uringen
DE Germany (34 regions) GR Greece (13 regions)
DE11 Stuttgart GR11 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
DE12 Karlsruhe GR12 Kentriki Makedonia
DE13 Freiburg GR13 Dytiki Makedonia
DE14 T¨ ubingen GR14 Thessalia
DE21 Oberbayern GR21 Ipeiros
DE22 Niederbayern GR22 Ionia Nisia
DE23 Oberpfalz GR23 Dytiki Ellada
DE24 Oberfranken GR24 Sterea Ellada
DE25 Mittelfranken GR25 Peloponnisos
DE26 Unterfranken GR30 Attiki
DE27 Schwaben GR41 Voreio Aigaio
DE30 Berlin GR42 Notio Aigaio
DE4 Brandenburg GR43 Kriti
DE50 Bremen ES Spain (18 regions)
DE60 Hamburg ES11 Galicia
DE71 Darmstadt ES12 Principado de Asturias
DE72 Gießen ES13 Cantabria
DE73 Kassel ES21 Pais Vasco
DE80 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra
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ES23 La Rioja IT Italy (20 regions)
ES24 Arag´ on ITC1 Piemonte
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid ITC2 Valle d’Aosta/Valle d’Aoste
ES41 Castilla y Le´ on ITC3 Liguria
ES42 Castilla-la Mancha ITC4 Lombardia
ES43 Extremadura ITD77 Rest of ITD
(ITD1+ITD2)
ES51 Catalu˜ na ITD3 Veneto
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia
ES53 Illes Balears ITD5 Emilia-Romagna
ES61 Andalucia ITE1 Toscana
ES62 Regi´ on de Murcia ITE2 Umbria
ES677 Rest of ES6 ITE3 Marche
(ES63+ES64)
ES70 Canarias (ES) ITE4 Lazio
FR France (22 regions) ITF1 Abruzzo
FR10 ˆ Ile de France ITF2 Molise
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne ITF3 Campania
FR22 Picardie ITF4 Puglia
FR23 Haute-Normandie ITF5 Basilicata
FR24 Centre ITF6 Calabria
FR25 Basse-Normandie ITG1 Sicilia
FR26 Bourgogne ITG2 Sardegna
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais NL Netherlands (12 regions)
FR41 Lorraine NL11 Groningen
FR42 Alsace NL12 Friesland
FR43 Franche-Comt´ e NL13 Drenthe
FR51 Pays de la Loire NL21 Overijssel
FR52 Bretagne NL22 Gelderland
FR53 Poitou-Charentes NL23 Flevoland
FR61 Aquitaine NL31 Utrecht
FR62 Midi-Pyr´ en´ ees NL32 Noord-Holland
FR63 Limousin NL33 Zuid-Holland
FR71 Rhˆ one-Alpes NL34 Zeeland
FR72 Auvergne NL41 Noord-Brabant
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon NL42 Limburg (NL)
FR82 Provence-Alpes-Cˆ ote d’Azur AT Austria (9 regions)
FR83 Corse AT11 Burgenland
IE Ireland (1 region) AT12 Nieder¨ osterreich
IE0 Ireland AT13 Wien
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AT21 K¨ arnten UKD5 Merseyside
AT22 Steiermark UKE1 East Riding
AT31 Ober¨ osterreich and North Lincolnshire
AT32 Salzburg UKE2 North Yorkshire
AT33 Tirol UKE3 South Yorkshire
AT34 Vorarlberg UKE4 West Yorkshire
PT Portugal (3 regions) UKF1 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire
PT1 Continente UKF2 Leicestershire
PT20 Regi˜ ao Aut´ onoma Rutland and Northants
dos A¸ cores (PT) UKF3 Lincolnshire
PT30 Regi˜ ao Aut´ onoma Worcestershire and Warks
da Madeira (PT) UKG1 Herefordshire
FI Finland (2 regions) UKG2 Shropshire and Staﬀordshire
FI1 Manner-Suomi UKG3 West Midlands
FI20 ˚ Aland UKH1 East Anglia
SE Sweden (7 regions) UKH2 Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire
SE01 Stockholm UKH3 Essex
SE02 ¨ Ostra Mellansverige UKI London
SE04 Sydsverige UKJ1 Berkshire, Bucks
SE06 Norra Mellansverige and Oxfordshire
SE07 Mellersta Norrland UKJ2 Surrey, East and West Sussex
SE08 ¨ Ovre Norrland UKJ3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight
SE077 Rest of SE0 UKJ4 Kent
(SE09+SE0A) UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
UK United Kingdom (32 regions) and North Somerset
UKC1 Tees Valley and Durham UKK2 Dorset and Somerset
UKC2 Northumberland, Tyne and Wear UKK3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
UKD1 Cumbria UKK4 Devon
UKD2 Cheshire UKL Wales
UKD3 Greater Manchester UKM Scotland
UKD4 Lancashire UKN Northern Ireland
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56Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for EU Countries
Number of Observations 14
Average GDP/GNI, 1995–2003 1.02
(0.04)
GDP/GNI in 1995 1.01
(0.03)
Capital Inﬂows / GDP, 1995–2003 (%) –3.15
(34.05)
Capital Inﬂows / GDP, 1991–1994 (%) 0.38
(8.62)
Avg. Net Assets/GDP, 1995–2003 (%) –15.24
(25.86)
Average GDP, 1991–1994 19.67
(8.22 )
Change in GDP/GNI Ratio 0.22
from 1996 to 2003 (2.73)
GDP Growth, 1992–1994 (%) 0.77
(1.18)
Population Growth, 1992–1994 (%) 1.52
(0.70)
Property Rights Institutions, 1991–1994 0.31
(0.03)
Legal Regulations in 1999 0.31
(0.04)
Financial Regulations in 1999 0.31
(0.08)
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported. GDP is Gross Domestic
Product and GNI is Gross National Income. GDP/GNI is the ratio of those. Capital Inﬂows /
GDP is the ratio of the sum of current account balance (sign reversed) to the average GDP over the
given years. Net Assets/GDP is the ratio of the net asset position to the GDP, averaged between
1995 and 2003. Average GDP is in thousands of constant 2000 U.S. dollars averaged between 1991
and 1994. Growth rate of GDP is the cumulative growth in the real per capita GDP between 1992
and 1994. Population growth is the cumulative growth rate of population between 1992 and 1994.
Institution and regulation variables are the principal component of each group of variables reported
in Table 22, see data appendix for further details.Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for NUTS2 Regions
Belgium Germany Spain France Italy Nether. Austria Portug. Sweden UK
Number of 11 34 18 22 20 12 9 3 7 32
Regions
Avg. Out./Inc. 1.29 1.36 1.44 1.37 1.35 1.51 1.39 1.66 1.55 1.36
1995–2003 (0.48) (0.15) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.09) (0.14)
Avg. GRP 16.89 18.92 11.12 16.17 19.62 16.36 18.12 5.88 20.28 13.37
1991–1994 (4.18) (6.49) (2.00) (2.99) (20.31) (2.49) (4.86) (1.12) (2.26) (1.99)
Chg. Out./Inc. 0.07 0.01 0.04 –0.04 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.13 –0.01 –0.01
1996–2003 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
GDP Growth (%) 5.77 8.32 –1.89 4.25 –2.77 5.24 6.22 5.66 –5.55 1.49
1992–1994 (0.93) (6.80) (0.71) (0.80) (0.84) (1.30) (0.80) (1.05) (0.52) (0.88)
Agr. Share (%) 2.01 1.73 5.41 4.67 3.99 4.62 3.25 7.25 3.56 2.81
in 1995 (1.14) (1.03) (3.65) (2.42) (1.70) (2.54) (2.41) (4.01) (1.94) (2.51)
Finance Share (%) 4.83 – 4.88 4.01 4.17 4.70 5.76 5.20 3.71 4.52
in 1995 (4.23) – (1.09) (1.02) (0.97) (2.52) (1.50) (1.07) (2.32) (2.01)
Manuf. Share (%) 19.77 – 17.33 20.13 18.73 18.82 20.23 9.41 22.67 23.98
in 1995 (6.82) – (8.30) (6.66) (7.62) (6.67) (6.17) (8.05) (5.66) (6.39)
Mining Share (%) 0.31 – 0.86 0.28 0.32 3.67 0.42 0.38 0.70 0.73
in 1995 (0.39) – (1.72) (0.23) (0.31) (7.93) (0.26) (0.16) (1.37) (0.74)
Avg. Migrat.(%) 0.10 0.34 0.13 – 0.22 0.32 0.13 – 0.31 0.27
1992–1994 (0.15) (0.41) (0.15) – (0.39) (0.79) (0.16) – (0.38) (0.34)
Avg. Retirem. (%) 15.13 15.17 14.89 15.50 16.59 13.01 14.31 12.94 17.82 15.95
1992–1994 (1.63) (1.32) (2.77) (2.57) (2.96) (1.78) (2.16) (1.20) (1.65) (1.76)
Avg. Pop. 0.91 2.38 2.17 2.61 2.84 1.27 0.87 3.32 1.24 1.82
1991–1994 (0.44) (2.88) (2.04) (2.19) (2.28) (0.97) (0.51) (5.32) (0.74) (1.28)
Trust –0.89 –0.80 –0.84 –0.91 –0.91 –0.80 –0.81 –0.85 – –0.82
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) – (0.02)
Conﬁdence –0.83 –0.84 –0.84 –0.82 –0.85 –0.80 –0.80 –0.81 – –0.83
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) – (0.02)
Notes: Means of the variables are reported (standard deviations in parenthesis). Avg. Out./Inc. is the ratio
of regional gross domestic product (GRP) to regional personal income (RPI), averaged between 1995 and
2003. Avg. GRP 1991–1994 is GRP in thousands of ECU divided by population, averaged between 1991 and
1994. GDP growth is cumulative growth rate of per capita GDP, for 1992 and 1994. All the sector shares
are the percentages of total value added in 1995. Avg. Migrat. is the absolute value of the net population
movements within the given country as percent of the total population, averaged between 1992 and 1994.
Avg. Retirm. is the share of population over age 65 as percent of the total population, averaged between
1992 and 1994. Avg. Pop. is population in millions of people, averaged between 1991 and 1994. Trust
and Conﬁdence indices are calculated using a mixed regional sample based on World Values Survey regional
speciﬁcation. We use the 1990–1991 wave of the survey. See data appendix for details.
58Table 3: Correlation Matrix for EU Countries
∆ GDP/GNI GDP/GNI GDP CI/GDP CI/GDP
96–03 95–03 91–94 91–94 95–03
∆ GDP/GNI 96–03 1.00
GDP/GNI 95–03 0.61 1.00
GDP 91–94 –0.50 –0.10 1.00
CI / GDP 91–94 –0.37 –0.12 –0.28 1.00
CI / GDP 95–03 0.29 –0.03 –0.81 0.30 1.00
NA/GDP 95–03 0.18 –0.01 0.26 –0.54 –0.06
Growth 92–94 0.44 0.55 0.32 –0.54 –0.17
Growth 95–03 0.67 0.83 –0.36 0.01 0.08
GDP/GNI 95 0.29 0.93 0.17 0.00 –0.25
Pop. Gr. 92–94 0.22 –0.09 -0.08 0.07 0.09
NA/GDP Growth Growth GDP/GNI Pop. Gr.
95–03 92–94 95–03 95 92–94
NA/GDP 95–03 1.00
Growth 92–94 0.52 1.00
Growth 95–03 –0.21 0.34 1.00
GDP/GNI 95 –0.06 0.49 0.68 1.00
Pop. Gr. 92–94 –0.16 –0.29 0.14 –0.21 1.00
Notes: All variables are demeaned. See Table 1 for deﬁnitions. CI is Capital Inﬂows, NA is Net Assets.
GDP/GNI, GDP 1991–1994, CI/GDP and NA/GDP are in logs.
59Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Pooled NUTS2 Regions
Out/Inc GRP AgrSh FinSh ManSh MinSh Ret Mig
Out/Inc 1.00
GRP 0.26 1.00
AgrSh –0.15 –0.32 1.00
FinSh 0.43 0.23 –0.31 1.00
ManSh –0.11 –0.01 –0.12 –0.32 1.00
MinSh 0.26 0.06 0.06 –0.16 –0.08 1.00
Ret –0.02 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.25 –0.01 1.00
Mig –0.29 –0.03 0.29 –0.23 –0.03 –0.06 –0.06 1.00
Change in Growth Out/Inc Pop.
Ratio 92–94 1995 Growth
Change in Ratio 1.00
Growth 0.00 1.00
Out/Inc 1995 –0.31 –0.17 1.00
Pop. Growth –0.24 –0.14 –0.07 1.00
Notes: The top panel reports correlations for level regressions. AgrSh is agriculture, FinSh is ﬁnance, ManSh
is manufacturing, and MinSh is mining shares of total value added in 1995. Ret is Retirement and Mig is
Migration. See Table 2 for the detailed deﬁnitions of the variables. All variables in this panel are in logs.
The bottom panel reports correlations of variables in change regressions. Change in Ratio is the change in
the Output/Income ratio between 1996 and 2003, Growth is the cumulative real per capita GDP growth
between 1992 and 1994, Out/Inc 1995 is the output/income ratio in 1995, and Pop. Growth is the cumulative
population growth between 1992 and 1994. All variables are demeaned.
60Table 5: Net Capital Income Flows, Net Assets and Current Account: Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: NA/GDP NA/GDP Out/Inc Out/Inc Out/Inc Out/Inc
95–03 95–03 95–03 95–03 95–03 95–03
Countries EU 14 EU 13 EU 14 EU 13 24 OECD 23 OECD
Ireland Yes No Yes No Yes No
CF / GDP –2.49 – – – – –
1991-1994 (1.94) – – – – –
CF / GDP – –2.50 – – – –
1991-1994 – (1.86) – – – –
CF / GDP – – –0.05 – 0.10 –
1991-1994 – – (0.38) – (1.56) –
CF / GDP – – – 0.08 – 0.14
1991-1994 – – – (2.46) – (4.27)
R2 0.29 0.27 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.53
Notes: See Table 1 for the deﬁnition of the variables. t-statistics in parentheses. NA denotes net assets
and CF denotes net capital ﬂows deﬁned as the ratio of sum of current account balance (sign reversed) to
the average GDP over the given years. The OECD sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United
States. For the OECD sample, the Output/Income ratio has a mean of 1.013 with standard deviation of
0.037 and the CI/GDP ratio has a mean 0.015 with standard deviation 0.113.
61Table 6: Capital Flows: EU Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var.: ∆Out/Inc ∆Out/Inc ∆Out/Inc ∆Out/Inc CF/GDP CF/GDP Out/Inc Out/Inc
1996–2003 1996–2003 1996–2003 1996–2003 1995–2003 1995–2003 1995–2003 1995–2003
Countries 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13
Ireland Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
GDP Growth 0.35 –0.12 0.35 –0.18 – – – –
1992–1994 (1.15) (0.49) (1.68) (1.60) – – – –
Population Growth – – 1.57 0.06 – – – –
1992–1994 – – (1.56) (0.13) – – – –
Output/Income – – 0.13 –0.84 – – – –
in 1995 – – (0.53) (4.71) – – – –
GDP Growth – – – – –0.14 1.48 – –
1995–2003 – – – – (0.12) (0.22) – –
Log Average GDP – – – – – – –0.02 0.00
1991–1994 – – – – – – (0.70) (0.11)
R2 0.18 0.03 0.36 0.68 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
Notes: See Table 1 for the deﬁnition of the variables. t-statistics in parentheses. NA denotes net assets and
CF denotes net capital ﬂows deﬁned as the ratio of sum of current account balance (sign reversed) to the
average GDP over the given years.
62Table 7: Net Capital Income Flows: Pooled NUTS2 Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Speciﬁcation Changes Changes Levels Levels
Number of Regions 168 168 168 168
IGrowth – 0.14 – –
– 6.14 – –
IOut * North1 – – – 1.07
– – – (5.70)
IOut * North2 – – – 0.21
– – – (4.90)
IOut * South – – – 0.01
– – – (1.99)
IGrowth / IOut * Belgium 0.02 – 1.16 –
(0.08) – (4.73) –
IGrowth / IOut * Germany 0.13 – 0.15 –
(6.16) – (3.20) –
IGrowth / IOut * Spain 0.64 – 0.00 –
(1.09) – (–0.15) –
IGrowth / IOut * France –0.10 – 0.23 –
(0.32) – (10.60) –
IGrowth / IOut * Italy 0.29 – 0.01 –
(1.16) – (2.55) –
IGrowth / IOut * Netherland 0.70 – 0.89 –
(2.03) – (7.22) –
IGrowth / IOut * Austria 0.29 – 0.56 –
(0.84) – (11.91) –
IGrowth / IOut * Portugal 1.25 – –0.15 –
(3.92) – (0.65) –
IGrowth / IOut * Sweden –0.61 – 0.34 –
(2.61) – (2.80) –
IGrowth / IOut * UK 0.08 – 0.32 –
(0.22) – (3.82) –
R2 0.49 0.48 0.68 0.64
Notes: Change regressions use the change in the Output/Income ratio between 1996 and 2003 while level re-
gressions use the log average output/income ratio between 1995 and 2003 as the dependent variable. IGrowth
is the cumulative growth rate of per capita GDP between 1992 and 1994, used in the change regressions
and IOut is the logarithm of average GDP between 1991 and 1994 used in the level regressions. Country
names and group names correspond to dummy variables. The group North1 consist of the Netherlands and
Belgium; North2 consists of Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, and the UK; while South includes Spain,
Italy, and Portugal. Greece is excluded from the sample. t-statistics in parentheses. For change regressions,
to test if the coeﬃcients for all countries can be accepted statistically to be identical, the F-statistic is 0.75
whereas the 5 percent critical value of the F(148,9) distribution is 1.94, implying that this hypothesis is not
rejected. For level regressions, we perform similar tests, and we can not reject the hypothesis of having 3
slopes, with an F-test value of 2.00. The F(148,7) 5 percent critical value is 2.07.
63Table 8: Change in Net Capital Income Flows: Pooled NUTS2 Regions
Dependent Variable: Change in Output/Income, 1996–2003
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Regions 168 168 168
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
IGrowth 0.14 0.11 0.07
(6.14) (2.66) (1.57)
Population Growth – –0.33 –0.49
from 1992 to 1994 – (1.32) (1.73)
Output/Income – – –0.07
in 1995 – – (1.43)
R2 0.47 0.47 0.49
Notes: Greece is excluded from the sample. t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions include country dummies.
IGrowth is the cumulative growth rate of per capita GDP between 1992 and 1994. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions.
64Table 9: Correlation Matrix for Mixed Sample
Change in Ratio Conﬁdence Trust Conf*IGrowth Trust*IGrowth IGrowth
Change in Ratio 1.00
Conﬁdence –0.34 1.00
Trust –0.28 0.22 1.00
Conﬁdence*IGrowth 0.19 0.09 –0.20 1.00
Trust*IGrowth 0.33 –0.27 –0.19 –0.11 1.00
IGrowth –0.18 0.07 0.37 –0.57 0.24 1.00
Out/Inc 1995–2003 –0.09 0.01 0.13 0.06 –0.09 –0.10
Conﬁdence*IOut –0.27 0.12 0.12 –0.34 0.05 0.30
Trust*IOut –0.15 0.15 –0.02 0.03 0.02 –0.16
N1*IOut 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.00 –0.08 0.11
N2*IOut –0.38 0.16 0.06 0.25 –0.28 –0.19
IOut –0.29 –0.05 0.04 0.21 –0.12 0.01
Out/Inc 1995–2003 Conf*IOut Trust*IOut N1*IOut N2*IOut IOut
Out/Inc 1995–2003 1.00
Conﬁdence*IOut –0.02 1.00
Trust*IOut 0.01 0.36 1.00
N1*IOut 0.51 0.09 –0.08 1.00
N2*IOut 0.29 –0.05 0.38 –0.07 1.00
IOut 0.19 –0.25 -0.04 0.27 0.58 1.00
Notes: We report the correlations for a mixed sample of NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions. Trust and Conﬁdence
are indices constructed using the World Values Survey questions. See the data appendix for further details.
We use log transformed indices. IGrowth is the cumulative growth rate of per capita GDP between 1992
and 1994. IOut is the logarithm of average GDP between 1991 and 1994. N1 is the North1 and N2 is
the North2 group of countries. North1 includes the Netherlands and Belgium; North2 consists of Germany,
France, Austria and the UK while the South group is the countries of Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Out/Inc
1995–2003 is the logarithm of the output/income ratio averaged between 1995 and 2003. Change in Ratio is
the change in the output/income ratio from 1996 to 2003.
65Table 10: Change in Net Capital Income Flows and Regional Social Capital: I
Dependent Variable: Change in Output/Income Ratio, 1996–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 107 105 105 107 105 105
Conﬁdence – –0.03 – – –0.03 –
– (1.67) – – (1.66) –
Trust – – 0.00 – – 0.00
– – (0.66) – – (0.64)
Conﬁdence * IGrowth – 0.24 – – 0.23 –
– (3.42) – – (3.40) –
Trust * IGrowth – – 0.06 – – 0.06
– – (1.80) – – (1.92)
IGrowth 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.08
(6.04) (5.85) (5.21) (3.22) (3.89) (2.40)
Population Growth – – – –0.33 –0.23 –0.32
from 1992 to 1994 – – – (1.68) (1.11) (1.57)
Output/Income – – – –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
in 1995 – – – (0.57) (0.46) (0.54)
R2 0.65 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.65
Notes: IGrowth is the cumulative growth rate of per capita gross domestic product between
1992 and 1994. Country dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses.
The sample is constructed using the regional speciﬁcation in World Values Survey. We use
the 1990-1991 wave of the survey. The dataset uses NUTS1 regions for Germany, France,
Portugal, and the UK and NUTS2 regions for Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Austria. The pooled sample excludes Greece and Sweden. See data appendix for detailed
description of variables that compose the indices. We use log transformed values of the
indices for regressions. The demeaned log conﬁdence index has a standard deviation of 0.19,
a maximum value of 0.43, and a minimum value of –0.55. The demeaned log trust index has
a standard deviation of 0.47, a maximum value of 0.79, and a minimum value of –1.81.
66Table 11: Change in Net Capital Income Flows and Regional Social Capital: II
Dependent Variable: Change in Output/Income Ratio, 1996–2003
(1) (2)
Country dummies Yes Yes





Conﬁdence * IGrowth 0.22 0.21
(2.94) (2.85)




Population Growth – –0.23
from 1992 to 1994 – (1.13)
Output/Income – –0.02
in 1995 – (0.46)
R2 0.68 0.68
Notes: IGrowth is the cumulative growth rate of per capita gross domestic product between
1992 and 1994. We use log transformed values of indices for regressions. Country dummies
are included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses. See Table 10 for further details.
67Table 12: The Role of Social Capital: Robustness
Dependent Variable: Change in Output/Income Ratio, 1996–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Core Conﬁdence –0.02 – – – –
(1.18) – – – –
Conﬁdence – –0.03 –0.03 – –
– (1.68) (1.66) – –
Core Conﬁdence * IGrowth 0.12 – – – –
(3.25) – – – –
Conﬁdence * IGrowth – 0.22 0.24 – –
– (3.39) (3.14) – –
Trust – – – 0.00 0.00
– – – (0.31) (0.66)
Trust * IGrowth – – – 0.07 0.06
– – – (1.96) (1.81)
IGrowth 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.33 0.11
(5.29) (1.68) (2.05) (1.96) (1.42)
IGrowth2 – –0.13 – –0.29 –
– (0.66) – (1.35) –
IOut – – –0.01 – 0.00
– – (0.37) – (0.22)
IOut * IGrowth – – 0.01 – –0.03
– – (0.06) – (0.30)
R2 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.64
Notes: IGrowth is the cumulative growth rate of per capita GDP between 1992 and 1994.
IOut is the logarithm of average GDP between 1991 and 1994. We use log transformed
values of the indices. Column (1) uses a core conﬁdence index, constructed using conﬁdence
in parliament, major companies, and the justice system. Other columns are based on the
conﬁdence index using all 11 conﬁdence questions, described in data appendix. Country
dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses. See Table 10 for further
details.
68Table 13: Correlation Matrix for Institutions
Change in Ratio PRI*IGrowth LR*IGrowth FR*IGrowth IGrowth Out/Inc 1995–2003
Change in Ratio 1.00
PRI*IGrowth 0.49 1.00
LR*IGrowth 0.43 0.85 1.00
FR*IGrowth –0.02 –0.24 –0.44 1.00
IGrowth –0.01 –0.22 –0.24 0.72 1.00
Out/Inc 1995–2003 –0.02 –0.10 –0.07 –0.11 –0.16 1.00
PRI*IOut –0.08 0.01 –0.03 –0.04 –0.05 0.13
LR*IOut 0.00 0.02 0.07 –0.04 0.03 0.02
FR*IOut –0.15 –0.17 –0.14 –0.26 –0.28 0.16
N1*IOut 0.06 –0.05 –0.02 –0.06 0.07 0.50
N2*IOut –0.22 –0.14 –0.02 –0.37 –0.26 0.33
IOut –0.14 –0.10 0.05 –0.24 –0.07 0.21
PRI*IOut LR*IOut FR*IOut N1*IOut N2*IOut IOut
PRI*IOut 1.00
LR*IOut 0.89 1.00
FR*IOut –0.37 –0.59 1.00
N1*IOut 0.05 –0.01 –0.04 1.00
N2*IOut 0.12 0.05 0.49 –0.03 1.00
IOut –0.58 –0.59 0.53 0.20 0.62 1.00
Notes: Change in Ratio is the change in Output/Income ratio between 1996 and 2003 and Out/Inc 1995–
2003 is the logarithm of the average output/income ratio between 1995 and 2003. IGrowth is the cumulative
growth rate of per capita GDP between 1992 and 1994, and IOut is the logarithm of average GDP between
1991 and 1994. N1 is the North1 dummy for regions of the Netherlands and Belgium; N2 is the North2
dummy for Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, and the UK. The principal component for each group of
variables reported in Table 22 is interacted with initial growth and initial output. PRI denotes property
rights institutions, LR denotes legal regulations and FR is ﬁnancial regulations. See data appendix for
details. All variables are demeaned.
69Table 14: Change in Net Capital Income Flows and Country Institutions
Dependent Variable: Change in Output/Income Ratio, 1996–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N of Obs 168 168 168 168
PRI*IGrowth – –0.04 – –
– (-0.02) – –
LR*IGrowth – – 0.27 –
– – (0.15) –
FR*IGrowth – – – –1.00
– – – (0.72)
IGrowth 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.23
(6.14) (5.00) (5.62) (1.75)
R2 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Notes: Principal component for each group of variables reported in Table 22 are used in the regressions. We
use property rights institutions in column (2), legal regulations in column (3), and ﬁnancial regulations in
column (4). IGrowth is the cumulative growth rate of per capita gross domestic product between 1992 and
1994. Greece is excluded from the sample. Country dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics in
parentheses.
70Table 15: Net Capital Income Flows and Regional Social Capital
Dependent Variable: Log of Output/Income Ratio 1995–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
C dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N of Obs 105 105 105 105 105
Conﬁdence – –0.01 –0.06 – –
– (0.16) (1.51) – –
Conﬁdence*IOut – 0.53 0.03 – –
– (2.40) (0.40) – –
Trust – – – 0.00 –0.04
– – – (0.07) (1.70)
Trust*IOut – – – 0.05 –0.10
– – – (0.32) (1.38)
IOut*N1 1.06 - 1.05 - 1.08
(5.67) - (5.53) - (6.75)
IOut*N2 0.22 - 0.23 - 0.27
(4.28) - (4.71) - (4.89)
IOut 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.16 –0.02
(0.87) (3.34) (0.02) (3.39) (1.06)
R2 0.74 0.39 0.75 0.34 0.76
Notes: IOut is the logarithm of average GDP between 1991 and 1994. We use log transformed values of
indices for regressions. See Table 10 for details. The pooled sample excludes Greece and Sweden. N1 is
North1, and N2 is North2 group of countries. The North1 group includes the Netherlands and Belgium, the
North2 group Germany, France, Austria, and the UK and the South group includes Portugal, Spain, and
Italy. Country dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses.
71Table 16: Net Capital Income Flows and Country Institutions: I
Dependent Variable: Log of Output/Income Ratio 1995–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N of Obs 168 168 168 168 168 168
PRI*IOut 1.48 1.00 – – – –
(5.38) (1.60) – – – –
LR*IOut – – 1.29 –0.31 – –
– – (4.94) (0.89) – –
FR*IOut – – – – –0.49 –0.22
– – – – (0.94) (0.57)
IOut*N1 - 0.85 - 1.09 - 1.05
- (3.20) - (5.35) - (5.37)
IOut*N2 - 0.01 - 0.24 - 0.20
- (0.04) - (3.44) - (5.09)
IOut 0.26 0.18 0.23 –0.03 0.16 0.02
(5.23) (1.70) (5.10) (0.64) (3.26) (1.16)
R2 0.46 0.64 0.38 0.64 0.31 0.64
Notes: Principal component for each group of variables reported in Table 22 are used in the regressions.
We use property rights institutions in columns (1)-(2), legal regulations in columns (3)-(4), and ﬁnancial
regulations in columns (5)-(6)6. The sample is the pooled NUTS2 regions excluding Greece. N1 is the North1
and N2 is the North2 group of countries. The North1 group includes Belgium and the Netherlands while
the North2 group includes Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, and the UK. IOut is the logarithm of average
per capita GDP between 1991 and 1994. Country dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics in
parentheses.
72Table 17: Net Capital Income Flows and Country Institutions: II
Dependent Variable: Log of Output/Income Ratio 1995–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
N of Obs 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
Inst NoCorr NoCorr LawOrd LawOrd GStab GStab BQual BQual No-Exp No-Exp
Inst*IOut 1.20 –1.66 5.51 3.78 2.06 1.14 3.52 0.50 2.91 1.86
(4.38) (2.58) (4.69) (2.37) (6.41) (2.97) (4.39) (0.95) (5.76) (3.75)
IOut*N1 - 1.33 - 0.74 - 0.89 - 1.02 - 0.83
- (5.51) - (3.19) - (4.16) - (5.34) - (3.81)
IOut*N2 - 0.50 - –0.02 - 0.06 - 0.16 - 0.02
- (3.96) - (0.16) - (0.83) - (2.82) - (0.27)
IOut 0.22 –0.23 0.30 0.22 0.28 0.15 0.20 0.04 0.26 0.17
(4.66) (2.41) (5.16) (2.47) (5.90) (3.12) (4.74) (1.45) (5.63) (3.92)
R2 0.40 0.65 0.51 0.65 0.47 0.65 0.43 0.64 0.49 0.66
Notes: The sample is the pooled NUTS2 regions excluding Greece. NoCorr is No-Corruption, LawOrd is Law
and Order, GStab is government stability, BQual is Bureaucratic Quality, and No-Exp is No Expropriation
Risk variable. See the data appendix for details on these variables. N1 is the North1 and N2 is the North2
group of countries. The North1 group includes Belgium and the Netherlands while the North2 group includes
Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, and the UK. IOut is the logarithm of average per capita GDP between
1991 and 1994. Country dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses.
73Table 18: Net Capital Income Flows and Industrial Structure
Dependent Variable: Log of Output/Income Ratio 1995–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector Agr Fin Man Min
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N of Obs 134 134 134 134
Sector Share –1.75 –0.43 –0.22 –0.20
(3.75) (0.56) (1.08) (0.37)
Sector Share *IOut –3.60 8.93 –1.40 3.52
(1.89) (4.44) (1.87) (2.70)
IOut 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13
(2.18) (2.98) (2.53) (2.75)
R2 0.41 0.58 0.37 0.35
Notes: The sample is the pooled NUTS2 regions excluding Greece. German data for sector shares are
not available and Germany is excluded from sample. Agr is the agriculture, Fin the Finance, Man the
manufacturing, and Min the mining sector shares. Sector shares are log transformations of the ratio of the
sector value added to total value added in 1995. IOut is the logarithm of average per capita GDP between
1991 and 1994. Country dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses.
74Table 19: Net Capital Income Flows and Industrial Structure: NORTH 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Out/Inc I Out/Inc I Out/Inc II Out/Inc II Out/Inc III Out/Inc III
Regions 23 23 23 23 23 23
Log Avg. GRP 1.07 0.56 1.10 0.44 1.10 0.71
1991–1994 (5.71) (3.67) (5.59) (2.99) (6.60) (10.67)
Log Fin. Share – 4.36 – 5.02 – 3.62
in 1995 – (3.78) – (4.54) – (4.83)
Log Man. Share – 0.84 – 0.98 – 0.43
in 1995 – (2.12) – (2.72) – (2.00)
Log Min. Share – 1.43 – 1.71 – 0.85
in 1995 – (3.50) – (4.37) – (3.34)
Log Agr. Share – 0.66 – –0.42 – –0.12
in 1995 – (0.59) – (0.36) – (0.19)
Log Avg. Retirement – 1.26 – 1.31 – –0.19
1992–1994 – (1.66) – (1.67) - (0.35)
Log Avg. Migration – 2.51 – 2.36 – 3.43
1992–1994 – (0.63) – (0.59) – (1.40)
R2 0.83 0.92 0.81 0.93 0.89 0.96
Notes: Sector shares are log transformations of the ratio of the sector value added to total value added in
1995. Migration is the ratio of net population movements within the given country to the total population,
averaged between 1992 and 1994. Retirement is the ratio of population over age 65 to the total population,
averaged between 1992 and 1994. The income measure is primary income for columns (1)-(2), intermediate
income deﬁned as primary income-taxes for columns (3)-(4), and disposable income deﬁned as primary
income-taxes+transfers for columns (5)-(6). The North1 sample consists of regions of Belgium and the
Netherlands. Dummies for these countries included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses.
75Table 20: Net Capital Income Flows and Industrial Structure: NORTH 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Out/Inc I Out/Inc I Out/Inc II Out/Inc II Out/Inc III Out/Inc III
Regions 46 46 46 46 46 46
Log Avg. GRP 0.41 0.48 0.42 0.53 0.63 0.60
1991–1994 (6.22) (5.60) (4.98) (5.44) (14.70) (8.08)
Log Fin. Share – –1.73 – –2.25 – –0.84
in 1995 – (1.51) – (1.81) – (1.08)
Log Man. Share – 0.08 – 0.03 – 0.06
in 1995 – (0.21) – (0.07) – (0.17)
Log Min. Share – –1.25 – –0.17 – –1.29
in 1995 – (0.58) – (0.07) – (0.80)
Log Agr. Share – –0.46 – –0.65 – –0.68
in 1995 – (0.71) – (0.95) – (1.53)
Log Avg. Retirement – 0.27 – 0.84 – –1.53
1992–1994 – (0.32) – (0.88) - (2.86)
Log Avg. Migration – –13.31 – –18.11 – –6.73
1992–1994 – (2.97) – (3.29) – (1.84)
R2 0.36 0.55 0.33 0.56 0.65 0.80
Notes: Sector shares are log transformations of the ratio of the sector value added to total value added in
1995. Migration is the ratio of net population movements within the given country to the total population,
averaged between 1992 and 1994. Retirement is the ratio of population over age 65 to the total population,
averaged between 1992 and 1994. The income measure is primary income for columns (1)-(2), intermediate
income deﬁned as primary income-taxes for columns (3)-(4), and disposable income deﬁned as primary
income-taxes+transfers for columns (5)-(6). The North2 sample consists of Germany, France, Austria,
Sweden and the UK. Retirement data for Cornwall, Isles of Scilly, and Devon of the UK are missing and
these regions are excluded from the regressions. Regions of Germany and France are not included due to
missing data. Country dummies countries included in all regressions. t-statistics in parentheses.
76Table 21: Net Capital Income Flows and Industrial Structure: SOUTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Out/Inc I Out/Inc I Out/Inc II Out/Inc II Out/Inc III Out/Inc III
Regions 38 38 38 38 38 38
Log Avg. GRP 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03
1991–1994 (2.33) (3.52) (3.11) (2.19) (2.28) (1.84)
Log Fin. Share – –0.52 – 1.41 – 1.08
in 1995 – (3.05) – (2.92) – (2.33)
Log Man. Share – –0.05 – –0.03 – 0.30
in 1995 – (1.29) – (0.30) – (2.99)
Log Min. Share – 0.09 – 1.20 – –1.20
in 1995 – (0.92) – (6.32) – (5.27)
Log Agr. Share – –0.04 – –0.44 – –0.90
in 1995 – (0.46) – (2.07) – (4.05)
Log Avg. Retirement – –0.20 – 0.02 – –0.55
1992–1994 – (1.68) – (0.10) - (2.11)
Log Avg. Migration – 1.46 – 4.30 – 4.22
1992–1994 – (3.37) – (4.65) – (1.84)
R2 0.17 0.49 0.22 0.60 0.18 0.70
Notes: Sector shares are log transformations of the ratio of the sector value added to total value added in 1995.
Migration is the ratio of net population movements within the given country to the total population, averaged
between 1992 and 1994. Retirement is the ratio of population over age 65 to the total population, averaged
between 1992 and 1994. The income measure is primary income for columns (1)-(2), intermediate income
deﬁned as primary income-taxes for columns (3)-(4), and disposable income deﬁned as primary income-
taxes+transfers for columns (5)-(6). The South sample consists of regions of Spain and Italy. Regions of
Portugal are excluded due to missing data. Country dummies included in all regressions. t-statistics in
parentheses.



















Government ownership of banks in 1970
Government ownership of banks in 1995
Notes: See the data appendix for a description of variables.
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